MORAL JUDGMENT OF DISRUPTIVE AND NONDISRUPTIVE STUDENTS AND THEIR TEACHERS

By

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
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MORAL JUDGMENT OF DISRUPTIVE AND NONDISRUPTIVE STUDENTS AND THEIR TEACHERS

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The purpose of this study was to examine moral judgment levels of disruptive and nondisruptive students and their teachers as a function of their membership in one of these three groups and other demographic characteristics.

Sixty male Caucasian eighth grade students from three junior high schools and an alternative school for behavior problem students were included in the student sample. This group was subdivided into two subgroups: 30 students identified as disruptive by their referral from teachers to special behavior adjustment classes or their referral to deans or guidance counselors for disruptive behavior and 30 students not so identified. The teachers in the sample were selected randomly at the same three schools from those who were currently working with the target grade level of the student group or their previous grade level.

Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview was administered to all 90 teacher and student subjects. The interviews were tape-recorded, then transcribed and coded for moral maturity scores. Multiple regression analysis was used for treatment of the data.

Nondisruptive students showed significantly higher levels of moral reasoning than disruptive students and showed evidence of more conventional moral reasoning according to Kohlberg's stages than disruptive students, who were primarily preconventional in moral reasoning. Teachers showed significantly higher levels of moral judgment than disruptive students and nondisruptive students, with the mean for teacher moral maturity closer to that of nondisruptive than to disruptive students.

Student demographic characteristics of academic rating, socioeconomic status, age (within the grade level control), and school membership were also investigated. The only demographic characteristic to show a relationship to moral judgment level among students was school membership in the nondisruptive group.

None of the teacher demographic characteristics, including sex, race, school membership, educational level, length of teaching experience, and subject area taught, were significantly related to moral judgment level.

The implications of the results for development of programs for behavior problem students and moral education programs in general were discussed. Because of the weak measures for the academic rating

and socioeconomic status variables, future research with more definite measures, and research into additional student variables in future studies were proposed. Investigation of family correlates was especially recommended. Exploration of a different or more precise set of teacher variables was also suggested for future research.

Although a significant relationship was found to exist between student behavior patterns and moral judgment levels in this study, the major question of what most contributes to this difference was left unanswered, and this question should direct future researchers.

CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM

Introduction and Background

A large body of theoretical and research literature has focused on moral development in childhood. Investigators operating from three major psychological frameworks--the psychodynamic or psychoanalytic, the behavioral or social learning, and the cognitive-developmental--and from a host of related philosophical and psychological positions have carried out studies describing moral development and behavior as a function of age, sex, race, socioeconomic level, intelligence, and school achievement, among other factors. Studies of moral reasoning and behavior have been carried out in homes and schools, in correctional settings, and in research laboratories. The goals of such research have been to describe the ways children think, reason, and behave in the moral domain.

Psychodynamic and behavioral researchers have focused on moral development brought about by such processes as imitation, parental identification and modeling, and rewards and punishments experienced in the environment. Cognitive-developmental theorists, from whose work the present research follows, have placed primary importance on the process and structure of moral reasoning in the child, assuming an underlying universality to the pattern of moral development in all children.

Growing out of the progressive tradition in education (Dewey) and the interactionist tradition in psychology (Piaget), the present cognitive-developmental framework for studying moral development is championed primarily by Kohlberg. Beginning two decades ago, Kohlberg incorporated the conceptual scheme and methodology of Piaget's psychological approach to development with philosophical principles of Kant and Rawls. A longitudinal study first published by Kohlberg in 1958 and continued to the present (Kohlberg, 1976a) has become the prototype for numerous related studies by Kohlberg, his colleagues, and other researchers. The Moral Judgment Interview, developed by Kohlberg as the major research instrument for studying cognitive aspects of moral development, has become the research tool for a growing body of research data on the development of moral maturity.

Kohlberg has described moral judgment as progressing through three levels, the Preconventional, the Conventional, and the Postconventional, each further divided into two stages. At the first stage, moral reasoning is dominated by fear of punishment and blind obedience to authority. The second stage is characterized by instrumental relativism with focus on reciprocity or the morality of the "deal." In the conventional realm, Stage 3 morality is motivated by the desire to be "nice" or "good" and to meet the approval of others. Stage 4 moralizing focuses on conformity to the larger society and to law and order within that society. Society and its laws are considered valid in their own right. Beyond the

conventional or conforming level, Stage 5 morality is characterized by contractual, democratic reasoning, with primary focus on the rights of others. Stage 6 reasoning is that of universal ethical principles and adherence to conscience and self-chosen ethical values such as justice, equality, and the dignity of individuals (Kohlberg, 1971a, 1971b, 1971c, 1975a, 1976a).*

Statement of the Problem

A major theoretical question in the cognitive-developmental framework has been whether and to what extent moral reasoning and behavior are related. Although Kohlberg does not claim that adequacy in moral reasoning according to his scale is causally related to adequacy in moral behavior, he asserts that moral judgment level should be a strong predictor of behavior. Several studies (Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968; Kohlberg, 1975a; Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971) have shown significant relationships between mature moral reasoning and moral behavior (refusal to shock the "victim" in Kohlberg's analysis of the Milgram data, and participation in principled civil disobedience, for example). A relationship of moral judgment and behavior has been sought in studies which examined moral judgment levels of subjects who displayed deviant or

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*NOTE: Kohlberg has done prolific writing from psychological, philosophical, and educational perspectives. Since many of the same concepts and findings are discussed in multiple references, only key sources are noted in this text. A complete bibliography is provided at the end of this dissertation.

"immoral" behavior of some kind (Campagna & Harter, 1975; Fodor, 1972, 1973; Kohlberg & Freundlich, in preparation). Hypotheses motivating such research have suggested that lower levels of moral reasoning would be characteristic of those demonstrating deviant behavior.

Although several studies have included delinquent or deviant youth, there seem to be no studies which focused on moral development of behavior problem youngsters in the school setting. These youngsters would be of most concern to the average educator, since they are causing problems in a normal school setting, and at least some of their problems would be considered the product of moral immaturity or irresponsibility.

Further, there is a lack of research on teacher moral judgment. Since moral reasoning processes make up part of the presage variables (Dunkin & Biddle, 1974) in the school setting, an exploration of this variable which teachers and pupils bring with them into the classroom could contribute to further understanding of the many aspects of classroom and pupil-teacher interaction within them often referred to as the "hidden curriculum" (Jackson, 1968; Kohlberg, 1970b, 1976b).

The present research was undertaken to add to the research literature on moral reasoning and to address the judgment/behavior question by examining pupil behavior in school as a function of pupil moral maturity as measured by Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview (Kohlberg, Colby, Gibbs, Speicher-Dubin, & Power, 1976). Is there a significant link between moral judgment and moral behavior, as exemplified in this study by identified disruptive student behavior? Is there a relationship between the type of behavior leading to referral of students by teachers as

behavior problems and moral judgment levels of teachers and pupils? These are the major questions this study was designed to investigate. Eighth grade students and their teachers were the target population.

In particular, the study was designed to investigate the relationship of moral judgment and disruptive behavior and the relationship of teacher and pupil moral development levels. This study was proposed to explore the issue of the correlation between moral judgment and moral behavior by comparison of the moral maturity of a group of students identified as disruptive with a group not so identified. The exploration of the relationship of teacher and pupil moral judgment levels was included to illuminate possible factors leading to identification of some students as problems by their teachers. Student demographic factors of age, sex, grade level, and race were controlled in this study, while teacher demographic data--years of teaching experience, race, sex, educational level, and subject area taught--were included for examination. Measures of student academic rating and socioeconomic status were also investigated as predictors of moral judgment.

A problem in this area of research is that moral reasoning and moral behavior are typically measured through hypothetical situations--moral judgment through the interview or objective scale with its dilemmas, and moral behavior through resistance-to-temptation, modeling, or cheating situations in laboratory settings. This study was proposed to deal in part with this problem by the sampling of a group of students who had been classified as deviant in certain acceptable school behaviors. Thus, while the measurement of moral judgment was still to be a hypothetical one (Kohlberg's interview), the assessment of moral behavior in this

study was to be based on actual behavior of the student. The assumption of the study was that underlying the disruptive classification would be some--and perhaps many--behaviors which could be classified as immature or even irresponsible morally, and that these behaviors would have been among those leading to problem referral. Reasoning of these students might be primarily preconventional in terms of Kohlberg's scale. Likewise, the control sample would be assumed to show more acceptable or conventional moral behaviors, or what Kohlberg has termed "reliable conformity" (1958) in the school setting. The crucial factor would be that whatever behaviors constituted problem classification in this study were naturally occurring problems rather than contrived situations.

The investigation of factors relating to problem referral has implications for educational program development. The concept of behavioral adjustment classes and programs is relatively new in schools. Impetus for such programs in Florida grew out of the Governor's Task Force on Disruptive Youth (1973), and continuation of the programs has been uncertain. Data from this type of study could be useful to the teachers and administrators setting up these types of programs as well as the teachers who refer students to them. Likewise, future and in-service teachers could gain insights into certain characteristics of students classified as behavior problems and the teachers who refer them, which would encourage attention to such developmental aspects in their pupils and in themselves.

The outcomes of this study could have implications for understanding developmental differences in moral reasoning of students classified as disruptive and those not so classified. If significant differences exist,

this finding might suggest the kind of content and processes that should be incorporated into adjustment classes and similar programs for problem students in schools, and possibly into regular classrooms as well. If no significant differences exist, then teachers and schools are faced with a more perplexing problem--that of helping students identified as deviant transfer their moral reasoning capacities into more acceptable moral action while attempting to understand why the action level lags behind the reasoning level in the moral domain for disruptive students.

Purpose of the Study

There were several specific purposes of this study. First, a major purpose was to add to the research literature on moral judgment arising out of Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach (Kohlberg, 1958, 1971a, 1971b, 1971c) and using his research instrument, the Moral Judgment Interview (Kohlberg et al., 1976; Kuhmerker, 1976). Since investigation of moral development from the cognitive-developmental framework of Kohlberg is still relatively young, a decision was made to use the instrument developed by Kohlberg (1958) and recently revised and updated in terms of format and scoring by Kohlberg and his colleagues (1976). This would serve to add to existing data collected by the same method and to provide an opportunity for cross-study and replication. Further, a gauge of the accuracy of the newly revised procedure for administering and scoring the interview could be obtained.

A second purpose of the study was to focus on the young adolescent showing disruptive behavior in the school setting. Previous research

on moral development and deviant behavior has been concentrated on the delinquent (Kohlberg, 1958; Kohlberg & Freundlich, in preparation) or the child or adult who has been incarcerated (Campagna & Harter, 1975; Fodor, 1972, 1973; Kohlberg & Freundlich, in preparation; Scharf, Hickey & Moriarty, 1973). This study was focused on the problem child who remains within the school system and is not incarcerated, but who has caused sufficient disruption in the school setting to come to the attention of teachers.

A third purpose was to investigate the moral judgment of teachers who work with the age group and grade level of the target students or who worked with the target students at their previous grade level. Although teachers have been asked to rank students on the basis of moral characteristics in earlier studies (Bull, 1967; Hartshorne & May, 1928-30; Kohlberg, 1958), direct investigation of teacher moral reasoning processes and maturity levels has not been included in the research. This seemed to be an important area for study, since the interaction of pupil and teacher moral reasoning and thinking might account for the labeling of some students as "disruptive," while others were not so labeled.

The fourth purpose of this study, then, was to examine this interaction found among the two student groups and the teacher group in moral judgment level. Naturally, a difference in moral judgment maturity was predicted between the teacher and student groups as a whole based on previous data showing a strong relationship of age and stage of moral

reasoning (Kohlberg, 1958, 1964, 1971c; Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1966). Further analysis was planned, however, to determine whether the teacher group was significantly closer to the moral judgment level of either of the two student groups and to determine significant likenesses and differences among the groups.

This research was designed to bring together three areas of inquiry--moral development research, investigation of problem behavior in young adolescents identified in the school setting, and research on presage variables affecting classroom interaction. No experimental treatment was involved in this study; rather, it was designed as an associational study of pupil and teacher presage variables, primarily moral reasoning stage. Information on classroom process was not sought directly, but the investigation was planned to explain partially one aspect of the interaction process of teachers and pupils, that of teacher identification of pupils as disruptive or nondisruptive based on their behavior. This identification was assumed to be at least partially a measure of pupil success in living up to teacher expectation. It was supposed that the methods of thinking and reasoning in the moral domain revealed through the Moral Judgment Interview might differ among the three identified groups in the study. These differences, in turn, might be a factor contributing to communication problems which in turn lead to classification of some students as behavior problems by their teachers.

In summary, the purpose of this study was to investigate moral reasoning processes of a group of teachers and two groups of eighth grade

boys, one group classified as behavior problems, and a control group. With sex, grade level, and race controlled for the students in this study, focus on moral development could be primary. The correlation of moral judgment levels of students with their identification as disruptive or nondisruptive by their teachers was also measured after the influence of measures of school achievement and socioeconomic status in the student sample was partialed out. Demographic characteristics of teachers were examined as predictors of teacher moral judgment level.

Research Questions

1.) Are there identifiable differences in levels of moral judgment among eighth grade male students identified as disruptive, eighth grade male students not so identified, and their teachers, as measured by Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview?

2.) Do the demographic factors of age and achievement level add to the prediction of problem and nonproblem group classification of students and to prediction of their moral judgment levels?

3.) Do the demographic factors of sex, race, length of teaching experience, educational level, and subject area taught add to the prediction of moral judgment levels of teachers?

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter includes a survey of theoretical and research literature relevant to the present study. Since they set the stage for this research, historical and conceptual perspectives on moral development in children are first presented in overview form, followed by a more detailed survey of Kohlberg's views and research from the cognitive-developmental perspective. Finally, research on the relationship of deviancy and delinquency to moral judgment and studies of the general association of moral reasoning with moral action are summarized and implications for the present research are discussed.

Historical and Conceptual Perspectives

Although recorded history has been filled with concern about the moral development of children, systematic studies of the development of morality have been undertaken only in the past 50 years. The early studies focused mostly on criteria such as good behavior and social acceptance as defined by social norms in determining relative levels of moral development in individuals. Dewey predated the findings and methodology of the early studies when he stated (1909):

> The moral has been conceived in too goody-goody a way. Ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more or less than social intelligence--the power of serving and comprehending social situations--and social power--trained capacities of control--at work in the service of social interest and aims. There is no fact which throws light upon the conditions of society, there is no power whose training adds to social resourcefulness that is not moral. (p. 43)

In the first major studies of moral character of the late 1920's, Hartshorne and May (1928-30, 1971; Kohlberg, 1963) defined character as "a set of culturally defined virtues (honesty, service, self-control) which were translated into measurable habits or traits" (Kohlberg, 1963, pp. 277-278). Hartshorne and May's research focus grew out of the work of Freud and Durkheim and reinforced "social relativism" as the primary determinant of moral judgment and behavior. Other researchers, including Kohlberg, have referred to this early focus as a "bag of virtues" approach (Kohlberg, 1958, 1971b, 1975a).

Havighurst's studies, representing more than 10 years of research throughout the late 1940's and the 1950's (Peck & Havighurst, 1960), were designed to examine character development. Parental identification was projected as the major source of moral development, and various measures of character strength--honesty, friendliness, self-control--were analyzed. Information was first sought on parent-child value agreement, then on agreement of the child's values with others around him, institutions he came in contact with, and media influences. The focus of "morality," however, was still somewhat narrowly defined within acceptable cultural norms, often local ones. Dewey had projected a broader meaning for moral development--predictive of the cognitive-developmental

school of thought on morality--than the "bag of virtues" approach encompassed by these early studies.

This preliminary research on morality delved very little into the nature and processes of moral development and moral thinking. Little support for any sort of general factor in morality emerged, although later reanalysis of the Hartshorne and May data by Burton in the 1960's (Burton, 1963, 1976; Grim, Kohlberg & White, 1968; Nelsen, Grinder & Mutterer, 1969) provided some support for a general factor underlying moral development as opposed to the situational relativism factor which predominated in the conclusions of Hartshorne and May. Using factor analysis, Burton was able to account for significant amounts of variance in the scores which were reported earlier, thus suggesting that more sophisticated data analysis procedures might turn situational moral development theory around. Nelsen et al. (1969) present a detailed discussion of procedures for statistical analysis in moral development research and discuss the need for more sophisticated techniques. Methodology itself, they conclude, may have been responsible for some of the early research findings and theory. The type of reinvestigation done by Burton began to give some support to the broader conception of moral development forseen by Dewey (1909) and to a nonrelativist position already gaining acceptance from the work of Piaget (1932) and studies using his methodology (Lickona, 1969, 1976a). A more detailed description of this psychological position, later to be called the cognitive-developmental approach, will be presented further in this review, but first a larger framework for the study of moral development will be considered.

Hoffman (1970), in his definitive review of moral development research, discussed three psychological frameworks--the psychoanalytic, the behavioral or social learning, and the cognitive-developmental--in which research has been carried out. Psychoanalytic or Freudian theory stresses the development of the superego or conscience. Bettelheim (1970) has stated that people do not develop mature morality unless they are subjected as children "to a stringent morality based on fear and trembling" (p. 87). Though a very strong statement of the psychoanalytic view, Bettelheim's words accurately reflect early research, in which words like "guilt," "transgression," "confession," and "temptation" were dominant. An example of this interpretation of such terms in psychoanalytic theory is given by Hoffman (1970): "guilt results from repressed impulses breaking into awareness and is primarily an unconscious phenomenon"; painful experiences following a perceived transgression by the child may be "direct expressions of guilt or defensive manifestations" of it (p. 288). Hoffman summarized the Freudian psychoanalytic view of moral development as that which characterizes the child as "a bundle of drives that must be subordinated to societal objectives" (p. 261). Socialization in psychoanalytic theory is equated with the process of moral development, and parents and other adults form the primary role models in the identification process.

Studies of emotional and motivational aspects of moral development (as opposed to cognitive components) have grown primarily from the

psychoanalytic tradition. Hoffman (1970) indicates that these researchers "have shown little concern with the problem of defining and conceptualizing morality or with the cognitive complexities involved in making moral judgments" (p. 282). This focus has pervaded many of the naturalistic childrearing studies as well as some laboratory investigations. Investigators do not agree on the precise mechanisms involved in parent-child relations, and two distinct strands of psychoanalytic research have resulted, according to Hoffman--the first focusing on identification and imitation processes by which the child adopts his parents' motives and standards, and the second dealing with the child's reactions to various discipline techniques, including the incorporation of parent prohibitions (p. 283).

A different view of moral development arises from the philosophical doctrine of the child as tabula rasa, a blank slate for experience to write on. This view of childhood has led to an environmental emphasis and to the behavioral, learning theory, and social learning approaches to moral development. Although the child in this philosophical framework is not seen as inherently possessing evil tendencies or good ones, adult intervention is still viewed as the main source of moral learning, and cultural and personal rewards and punishments are the mechanism of this intervention.

Eysenck (1976) presents the purely behavioristic view of morality when he states that acquisition of conscience is linked with the conditioning of anxiety. (Here is a great similarity to the psychoanalytic

view expressed by Bettelheim.) Thus, "conscience is a conditioned reflex," according to Eysenck (p. 109). Improper conditioning is responsible for immoral conduct, in his view, along with strictly biological factors. Eysenck cites the advantages of such a viewpoint; it is founded on "well-established principles based on detailed laboratory experiments" ("it does not invoke divine guidance or ad hoc concepts," he adds), and "it leads to testable conclusions" (p. 109). Few current behaviorists are so rigid in their definitions, but experimental research, primarily carried out in laboratories, characterizes the methodology of this conceptual framework. Dealing with the effects of conditioning, including external rewards and punishments, this line of research has produced evidence for moral development based almost entirely on external conditions rather than on the child himself.

Several strands of behavioral research have been prevalent. Researchers on modeling explore how children imitate behavior to which they are exposed vicariously and behaviors which they see rewarded, punished, or ignored in a model. Characteristic studies of modeling are reported by Aronfreed (1969), Bandura and Walters (1963, 1969), and Hartup and Coates (1967).

Aronfreed's work on external and internal controls (1968) reflects interests similar to researchers on modeling processes. According to Aronfreed, younger children are controlled by external rewards and punishments, but gradually the children develop controls of their own. They, in a sense, learn to give their own rewards.

Behavioral and social learning studies have often challenged other theoretical positions on moral reasoning in children as exemplified by studies in which training is given to stimulate increased maturity in responding to moral situations (Crowley, 1968; Jensen & Hughston, 1971), and studies of role taking (Arbuthnot, 1975). These studies challenged integral aspects of the cognitive-developmental view of Piaget and Kohlberg, in which cognitive development and role taking abilities are primary antecedents of mature moral reasoning.

Many of the experts see the psychoanalytic and social learning perspectives as blending into one research approach. A somewhat negative view of this union is stated by Hoffman (1976): the "doctrinaire view, present in both psychoanalysis and behaviorism has been that altruistic behavior can always be explained ultimately in terms of instrumental self-serving motives in the actor" (p. 124). More positively, the union is exemplified in the Peck and Havighurst character studies (1960), in the extensive identification studies of Sears, Maccoby and Levin (1957) and Sears, Rau and Alpert (1965), in Hoffman and Saltzstein's study (1967) of parent discipline, Hoffman's study (1971) on identification and conscience, and Lydiat's study (1973) of parental influence in moral development. In their most recent writings, Aronfreed (1976) and Mischel and Mischel (1976) have also dealt with the integration of social learning and cognitive-moral views of development.

In the third major psychological approach to childhood moral development--the cognitive-developmental--the child himself is seen as the

most active part of the moralization process. Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) see the ideological precedent of the cognitive-developmental view in the progressive education movement following Dewey (1938). In this interactionist view, both the child and the environment are seen as strong forces, the child himself constructing his world (and thus his moral view) as he interacts with it. Piaget is the best representative of this structuralist tradition in the early period of moral development research. In Piaget's view, the child is more "actor" than "acted upon," and his interactions with agemates, along with his own development of higher cognitive processes, assume great importance in influencing moral development, with adult interventions and environmental influences assuming a secondary role. Seeing through the child's eyes is an important aspect of cognitive investigations of moral development (Piaget, 1932).

In the cognitive-developmental approach, written and verbal interview techniques have been the major methodology, involving as they do the child's expression of his own thinking and reasoning, or his "moral judgment." Temptation and modeling situations of the psychoanalytic and behavioral studies are replaced with techniques which yield more developmental and less situational data.

Piaget (1932) developed numbers of short situational dilemmas, presented generally in pairs, in which subjects were asked to judge rightness and wrongness in the situation and who should be punished most. Typical Piaget stories present situations in which one child does a small amount of damage (breaking one cup, for instance) while disobeying

his parents or acting irresponsibly, while another child accidentally does a larger amount of damage (breaking a whole tray of cups, for example) while acting responsibly or obeying adults (p. 118). Questions on these stories are open-ended, the child's answers dictating the order and sometimes the content of further questions. The researcher probes for evidence of the child's understanding of intentionality in the situation. Piaget called his method "clinical," and this approach has characterized the moral development research of Piaget, Kohlberg, and others using their theories and techniques.

A number of researchers have used these stories directly or made adaptations of their own (Buchanan & Thompson, 1973; Chandler, Greenspan, & Barenboim, 1974; Durkin, 1960; Gutkin, 1972; Jensen & Rytting, 1972; Lickona, 1976c). Kohlberg drew heavily on Piaget's pioneer work in developing his Moral Judgment Scale and Moral Judgment Interview (Kohlberg et al., 1976; Kohlberg, 1976a). Piaget's stories were designed to discriminate two kinds of moral reasoning: heteronomous, where rule is absolute, adults hold the power, and immanent justice governs, and autonomous, where rules are changeable if others agree (Edwards, 1965; Piaget, 1932). Hoffman (1970) sees "elements of Piaget's heteronomy in Kohlberg's stages 1 to 4 and elements of Piaget's autonomy in Kohlberg's stages 2 to 6" (p. 277). The important work of Kohlberg and his colleagues on Piaget's basic scheme is discussed separately in the next section of this review.

Piagetian structuralism assumes that children are qualitatively as well as quantitatively different from adults, that development occurs

through a series of cognitive stages, each of which incorporates the previous stage and eventually replaces it, and that invariant sequence in cognitive and moral development is universal for all children. Piaget (1932) summarized his work as follows:

> There seem to exist in the child two separate moralities, of which, incidentally, the consequences can also be discerned in adult morality . . .. The first of these processes is the moral constraint of the adult, a constraint which leads to heteronomy and consequently to moral realism. The second is cooperation which leads to autonomy. Between the two can be discerned a phase during which rules and commands are interiorized and generalized. (pp. 194-195)

For Piaget, the "morality of duty" is essentially heteronomous; "right is to obey the will of the adult" (p. 195). For autonomy to emerge, reciprocity and respect are necessary components, according to Piaget; "moral autonomy appears when the mind regards as necessary an ideal that is independent of all external pressure" (p. 196). Role taking is considered a necessary part of this developing autonomy. Typical studies of role taking (Selman & Berne, 1974) have investigated the child's ability to take the part of another and understand his point of view. In this type of research, an especially sharp deviation from the behavioral approach is expressed.

In his review of history and conceptual frameworks in moral development, Kohlberg (1969) refers to these same three theoretical bases as the psychosexual-maturational, the associationist-learning, and the cognitive-developmental. He mentions anthropological culturology as another

conceptual dimension influencing socialization research, particularly naturalistic cross-sectional correlation studies. Other authors (Edwards, 1965; Kay, 1968, 1975; Luria, Goldwasser, & Goldwasser, 1963; Weinreich, 1974) discussed other philosophical and research approaches, but these can basically be seen as variations of the same three larger frameworks.

All of the approaches discussed here essentially seek to account for a similar goal, internalized moral behavior. They differ primarily in how they see the acquisition of this behavior taking place. Lickona (1976a) states that different theories begin with different kinds of questions, so that social learning theorists have tended to ask about variation and discrimination in moral behaviors, while developmentalists ask how we can account for the wholeness of human functioning in the process of moral reasoning (p. 18). All approaches, he says, need and balance each other.

Relevant to the present research is the fact that the vast numbers of research studies from all of these perspectives have done little to alleviate public concern over childhood moral development. Current fears of breakdown in discipline and responsible behavior are clearly evident in polls measuring public attitudes toward education. Gallup's findings (1975, 1976) showed "lack of discipline" in schools as the primary concern of those interviewed. "In fact," says Gallup (1976), "discipline has been named most often seven times during the last eight years" (p. 188). To a question asking whether schools should take on a greater share of the responsibility for the moral behavior of children, 67 percent of the 1976 respondents answered positively (p. 197). In addition,

39 percent selected "Emphasize moral development" from a list of ways to improve the quality of public schools, along with devoting more attention to teaching basic skills (51 percent), enforcing stricter discipline (50 percent), meeting individual needs of students (42 percent), and improving parent/school relations (41 percent).

Concern over substantial increases in school misbehavior and vandalism in Florida led to the Governor's Task Force on Disruptive Youth (1973) and to two statewide conferences within a six-month period to attack growing problems of disruption. The Safe Schools Act of 1973 funded developmental programs and preventive measures for all school districts in Florida, following the recommendations of this task force relative to disruptive behavior of youngsters.

Since this study focuses on the concern for disruptive behavior and was designed to explore the moral reasoning component of such behavior, the remainder of this review will deal specifically with the cognitive-developmental research and the specific research on deviancy and delinquency which form the background for this study.

Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Moral Development

Hoffman (1970), in his extensive review of moral development from all three major psychological perspectives, concluded that empirical support for the cognitive-developmental theory of moral development was "uneven" and that major contributions of the cognitive-developmentalists to date had been "conceptual and theoretical" (p. 281). Despite the

publication of several major theoretical papers by Kohlberg in the period immediately following this review (Kohlberg, 1971a, 1971b, 1971c) and extensive work on the current research instrument (Kohlberg, 1976a; Kohlberg et al., 1976; Kuhmerker, 1976), this conclusion is still valid. Much of the research support for Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental position is contained in unpublished manuscripts, papers presented at conferences, and research by members of the Moral Education Center at Harvard University. Kuhmerker (1973a), Kurtines and Greif (1974), and Simpson (1974) all mention the "in-house" nature of the Kohlberg research as a major problem for other researchers. Most of the articles and instruments have been available only through Kohlberg's office or through periodic workshops held to teach the instrument and its scoring.

A collection of research findings make up the chapters of a still unpublished book variously called Research on Moralization, the Cognitive-Developmental Approach and Recent Research in Moral Development, edited by Kohlberg and Turiel, and referenced from 1970 to the present (see Kohlberg, 1970a, p. 136; 1971a, p. 53; 1971b, p. 234; 1975a, p. 677; Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972, p. 496). Although sections of this forthcoming book are available in a rough manuscript form, many of the chapters and articles are still without tables, exact statistics, or bibliographical data. Thus, this summary of research validation for Kohlberg's theory is drawn primarily from Kohlberg's discussions of the research findings in his theoretical articles.

Kohlberg himself states in his most recent published chapter (1976a) that he makes no attempt to review the research of moral development

comprehensively, as such reviews have been done earlier (Kohlberg, 1964, 1969) and are forthcoming. The book in preparation, Kohlberg states, "reports on forty studies which present an accumulation of replicated findings firmly consistent with a cognitive-developmental theory of moralization, and quite inexplicable from the view of socialization research" (p. 49). The book which contains this current Kohlberg chapter (Lickona, 1976b) stands as the most comprehensive collection of moral development writing to date, but a broad range of research and theory in the field are treated, not just the cognitive-developmental approach. This section of the literature review, then, must stand on what published studies are available and on Kohlberg's theoretical discussions of other empirical materials yet to be published.

Kohlberg's studies of moral development form the starting point for the type of investigation carried out in the present research and provide the instrumentation for it. Kohlberg drew heavily on Piaget's structuralist foundation, but he developed a more explicit six-stage hierarchy of moral reasoning. Following the lead of Piaget and Dewey, Kohlberg has investigated the problem of how moral maturity is acquired and has viewed it as a process of structural-cognitive development. The most recent description of Kohlberg's three levels and expanded six stages of moral development (1976a) are shown in Appendix A. For Kohlberg, conventional morality (Stages 3 and 4) implies conforming to and supporting society's rules and expectations because they are

just that, and because they are considered valid in their own right. The preconventional individual does not yet understand society's expectations and rules, and thus does not uphold them in a conventional manner, and the postconventional individual understands the expectations and rules, but seeks the underlying principles as a more fundamental guide to his moral reasoning.

Kohlberg's assumptions are that levels of development are universal, cross-cultural, age-related, sequential, and consistent (1968, 1969, 1975a). The sequence of moral stages is highly related to Piaget's stages of cognitive development (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1972). According to Piaget, a child at about age 7 becomes capable of concrete logical thought--that is, he can think logically and classify things. At early adolescence, the child enters a period called formal operations, in which he becomes capable of reasoning abstractly. As Kohlberg (1975a) noted, moral reasoning is one important aspect of logical reasoning. With Piaget, Kohlberg sees cognitive maturity as "necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral judgment maturity" (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1972, p. 164). Development in the moral area, according to Kohlberg (1975a), is strongly associated with growth:

> A person whose logical stage is only concrete operational is limited to the preconventional moral stages (Stages 1 and 2). A person whose logical stage is only partially formal operational is limited to the conventional moral stages (Stages 3 and 4). While logical development is necessary for moral development and sets a limit to it, most individuals are higher in logical stage than they are in moral stage. (p. 671)

Because of this, Kohlberg claims that 50 percent of late adolescents are capable of full formal reasoning based on their cognitive stage, but only 10 percent of these young adults actually display moral reasoning in the highest stages, according to his studies (p. 671).

Although there is no strict age relationship to stages, movement takes place from one stage to the next highest, and teachers (as well as parents and other adults) can actually help to move children through the stages, according to Kohlberg. Studies by Rest et al. (1969), Turiel (1966), and Turiel and Rothman (1972) have partially validated the direction of stage movement and the concept of invariant sequence.

In his early work, Kohlberg (1958) field-tested his model of moral development cross-culturally and concluded that moral development stages could be seen as invariant and universal sequences for all children in all cultures. Kohlberg's moral dilemmas are somewhat similar to Piaget's stories, but are not presented in pairs and are more open-ended in situation and in the questioning related to each situation. Typical Kohlberg moral dilemmas are shown in Appendix B and are discussed briefly in Chapter III.

Kohlberg has recently summarized quite succinctly the assumptions of his age-linked stage theory of structural reorganization of moral judgment (1976a). These are:

1. Moral development has a basic cognitive-structural or moral judgmental component.

2. The basic motivation for morality is a generalized motivation for acceptance, competence, self-esteem, or self-realization, rather than for meeting biological needs and reducing anxiety or fear.
3. Major aspects of moral development are culturally universal, because all cultures have common sources of social interaction, role taking, and social conflict, which require moral integration.
4. Basic moral norms and principles are structures arising through experiences of rules that exist as external structures; moral stages are not defined by internalized rules, but by structures of interaction between the self and others.
5. Environmental influences in moral development are defined by the general quality and extent of cognitive and social stimulation throughout the child's development, rather than by specific experiences with parents or experiences of discipline, punishment, and reward. (p. 41)

In an earlier article, Kohlberg (1975a) discussed his reasons for viewing cognitive-developmentalism as more reasonable than views projected by religious, cultural, or social norms:

> Why are decisions based on universal principles of justice better decisions? Because they are decisions on which all moral men could agree. When decisions are based on conventional moral rules, men will disagree, since they adhere to conflicting systems of rules dependent on cultural and social position. Throughout history men have killed one another in the name of conflicting moral rules and values, most recently in Vietnam and the Middle East. Truly moral or just resolutions of conflicts require principles which are, or can, be universalizable. (p.673)

In this statement and in his general emphasis on justice as the central concept of universal morality, Kohlberg draws heavily on the philosophy and theory of Rawls (1971). Kohlberg (1963) rejects the "'superego strength' view of the role of the social environment as

'stamping into' the child given cultural roles which persist as internal moral structures through life" (p. 315). He claims that his stage theory allows for higher levels of moral judgment with internalized values rather than socially structured ones characteristic of the highest stages of development.

Cognitive maturation and stimulation of further development are important in Kohlberg's view, but factors of general social experience and stimulation, called "role taking opportunities" by Kohlberg (1976a), are more important. The moral dilemmas of Kohlberg's interview are constructed to place the subject in a role taking situation, and moral discussions in Kohlberg moral education programs also incorporate this opportunity (Kohlberg, 1976a; Rest, 1974; Wasserman, 1976). Kohlberg prefers the term "role taking" to terms indicating "sympathy" or "empathy" of one individual toward another. The role taking process, he says, emphasizes cognitive as well as affective aspects, provides for an organized structural relationship between self and others, involves the individual in all his societal roles, and role taking is part of all communication and interaction situations, not just those arousing sympathy or empathy. For Kohlberg, role taking is a measure of social cognition--a bridge between logical-cognitive level and moral level (p. 49).

Kohlberg (1976a) has recently summarized the position of moral judgment in personality. First, an individual attains a certain level of logical reasoning (i.e., stages of cognitive development as defined by Piaget). Next come stages of social perception or role taking; the individual has seen the "systems" in the world, and now he comes to see

the place of himself and other individuals in the system. From these logical and social perspectives, the individual's moral judgment grows (p. 32).

The final step in the horizontal sequence described by Kohlberg is moral behavior. Kohlberg (1976a) states that "to act in a morally high way requires a high stage of moral reasoning" (p. 32). A person can, however, "reason in terms of such principles and not live up to them" (p. 32). This limitation was illustrated in a study by Rest et al. (1969) designed to test movement through the stages and to validate the hypothesis that children are more likely to make changes toward a higher stage of reasoning than toward a lower one. At one point in the research, children were asked to look at a list of "advice" responses to moral dilemmas representing various stages and to choose what they considered the "smartest" advice as well as to give their "own advice." One child who ranked Stage 4 overall chose as "smartest" the Stage 6 advice to steal a drug for a dying person because of the moral values of human life, but added, "Jean was smart to say you would be morally right to steal, but it's still wrong, so don't." The researchers noted that "this child seems aware of the lofty ring of the words 'morally right' but for her the real determiner of right is the law concerning stealing and her total reaction is based on the resulting considerations" (p. 239).

"From the point of view of cognitive-developmental theory, the relationship of the development of judgment to action is something to be studied and theoretically conceptualized; the issue is not one of 'validating' a judgment test by a quantitative correlation with behavior,"

Kohlberg (1976a, p. 46) states. Nevertheless, Kohlberg and other researchers have included investigations of the judgment-action correlation in their studies, and the research application of Kohlberg's view will be illustrated by a group of these studies related to delinquency and deviancy and moral judgment in the next section of this review.

Research on Deviancy, Delinquency, and the Relation of Judgment to Action

Kohlberg's contention (1975a) that moral judgment, while not synonymous with moral behavior, is the "single most important or influential factor yet discovered in moral behavior" (p. 672) has led to studies in which researchers have attempted to examine the moral judgment component in subjects' behavior. Often these subjects have been characterized by some history of deviancy or delinquency.

Behavior problem and nonproblem students were discriminated in Kohlberg's initial research sample (1958) through a rating scale completed by teachers. Teachers were asked to rank 34 students on the following personality variables: strength of conscience, obedience, independence of judgment, fair-mindedness, effort, ambitiousness, response-seeking (or dependence on teacher), and response-seeking from peers (p. 135). Only two of these variables--strength of conscience and fair-mindedness--showed moderately high correlations with moral judgment. Kohlberg evaluated these as measures of "reliable conformity" or nonproblem behavior in school, and he found that all the boys in the top third of his moral judgment interview and scale were rated

above the median on reliable conformity by teachers. Boys lower on moral judgment scores were primarily ranked below the median.

Kohlberg also compared the moral judgment of 23 identified delinquents with a nondelinquent sample in his 1958 study. When the mean score for delinquents was compared with the mean score of nondelinquent lower class 16-year-olds in an analysis of variance, the difference was significant at the .01 level ($t = 3.28$ with 22 df) (pp. 102, 138). What differed in the two groups was not the choice made in the moral dilemma, but the thinking and reasoning process. Kohlberg concluded that the delinquent was "someone who is at a very low level of internalization of norms or conformity pressures in general" (p. 139).

In his discussion of the findings, Kohlberg cited delinquency as "an example of the conflicts which arise when the developmental character of morality is ignored" (p. 357). Sociologists, according to Kohlberg, see delinquents as "holding the same formal attitude of group conformity as that held by the 'moral' citizen, but directing it to different cultural content" (p. 357). The psychologist sees delinquents as differing from nondelinquents in "general inhibition or conformity strength." So, Kohlberg concluded:

> The integrative task is to see the delinquent both as someone who does have positively definable values rather than simply as an unchecked primitive id, yet whose values do not have many of the characteristics implied by the concept of morality. Such a task implies a more gradated and developmental concept of morality than that provided by either the superego or "group conformity." Our findings on the delinquents suggest that their morality is an extension of modes of thinking common to many 10-year-olds. (1958, p. 357)

In the conclusion of this early study, Kohlberg stated that longitudinal studies of the "pre-delinquent" years of 11 to 14 were greatly needed. "The psychological information and understanding which is useful for the parent or moral educator is of the kind which allows him to have attitudes appropriate to the child as an increasingly moral agent," states Kohlberg (1958, p. 359). Kohlberg further concluded that sympathetic introspection of the typical stages of the child's moral development is important, because such understanding enables parents and educators to see "where the child is and where he has yet to go in terms of a broader frame of values than that involved in appraising conformity to home and school routines" (p. 360).

In discussing both the early and later work on moral judgment in youthful offenders, Kohlberg and Freundlich (in preparation) stress that early studies assumed delinquents to be "morally defective" both in verbal statements and moral action. This view was abandoned, however, as delinquency came to be explained by various pathologies and environmental deficiencies. Kohlberg and Freundlich felt that "early researchers were on the right track in assuming that delinquents were 'less moral' in conscious verbal values but they were mistaken in assuming that these moral differences would be reflected in the content of what was judged right or wrong" (p. 2).

These authors suggested that there is little evidence of a relationship between content of what is judged right or wrong and actual moral behavior, but that there are major differences in the form of moral orientation at various developmental stages which are related

to actual moral behavior. For instance, in an often-used Kohlberg dilemma (Appendix B) a man is faced with the choice of stealing a drug which might save his wife's life from a druggist who is charging ten times what the drug costs him to make or not stealing the drug and letting his wife die. The content of a subject's responses to this dilemma might include an initial answer that the man should steal the drug to save his wife's life or that he should refrain from breaking the law, thus not stealing the drug. These answers represent the content of moral judgment; process or form are shown in the reasoning used by the subject to support the content choice. At the preconventional level, a person might choose to steal the drug in hopes that his wife would do the same for him someday or because he needs his wife to cook and clean for him. At a conventional level, the person steals because he has a sense of duty and obligation to his wife based on his marriage vows and his commitment to her. At the postconventional level, a person might say he would steal because he recognizes that the underlying value of human life is the only reason for which laws exist.

Cognitive-developmental theorists assume "that there must be marked differences in form of moral orientation between offenders committing . . . repetitive serious offenses against the person or property of others, and adolescents who do not engage in such offense" (p. 2).

The samples discussed by Kohlberg and Freundlich include six groups, three from studies of the authors, and three from other investigators. All samples involved incarcerated male delinquents with social class and intelligence controlled; four samples were American, two were from

other countries, and all studies used Kohlberg's moral judgment dilemmas in verbal format.

Pooling results of these adolescent delinquent studies (a research technique called "meta-analysis" and discussed by Glass, 1976), Kohlberg and Freundlich found little difference in content of moral choices made by delinquents; further, the differences found were not always in a consistent direction. In each sample, however, the control group was significantly higher than the delinquent group in moral maturity or the process of moral reasoning (p. 5). The following findings are reported:

1.) In terms of process of moral thinking, younger delinquents are not only "retarded in moral maturity compared to same-age controls," but they also "do not develop in the period 12 to 20 as much as do non-delinquent controls" (p. 6).

2.) Delinquents use preconventional stages (1 or 2) more, and controls use conventional stages (3 and 4) more. Chi square analysis when all groups were pooled showed a significant difference ($\underline{x}^2 = 30.8$, $\underline{p} < .001$) in stage usage.

While findings from these studies indicate that delinquent moral judgment was less mature than that of controls in the groups sampled, the authors stress that it is inappropriate to view delinquents as representative of a certain type of "moral character" (p. 14). They conclude:

> Delinquent acts, however, do have clear-cut moral implications so that an understanding of individual delinquents presupposes an understanding of how they deal with the moral implications of delinquent behavior . . .. While pre-conventional moral judgment is not a cause of delinquency, conventional moral judgment is a major condition for avoidance of delinquent action when personal-need or situational forces provide strong incentive for delinquent action. (pp. 14-15)

In general, then, these studies showed that the higher an individual's moral stage, the more he is able "to resist situational forces toward behavior inconsistent with his moral judgment structures" (p. 15). Kohlberg and Freundlich concluded that adolescents at the conventional level of moral development found delinquent behavior inconsistent with their moral structures and self concept. Delinquent behavior, however, was more compatible with preconventional moral orientation, since the preconventional view is essentially "normless" or "lacking in social bonds" (p. 18). Thus, delinquency occurs when "bonds holding man to society have broken down" (p. 19). The researchers summarized by stating that the reasons most individuals are not delinquent is that they feel attached to others and committed to society and the social order.

Added to the Kohlberg studies and the research reviewed by Kohlberg and Freundlich are a number of other studies which have measured the relationship of moral judgment and delinquency or deviancy. Among these are studies which have investigated family correlates and those carried out with institutionalized youngsters or in correctional settings.

Two of the studies discussed by Kohlberg and Freundlich--Hudgins and Prentice (1973) and Campagna and Harter (1975)--are included in the following section of this review for additional analysis. All of this research was carried out within the cognitive-developmental perspective, and all involved use of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview except for that of Eschel, Kugelmass and Breznitz (1968), which involved Piagetian stories.

Several of the delinquency studies were designed specifically to investigate the family correlates of moral judgment. Hudgins and Prentice (1973) compared moral maturity scores of delinquent and nondelinquent youngsters and their mothers. The findings were in the predicted directions; mothers were higher in moral judgment than adolescents, nondelinquent adolescents were higher than delinquents, and mothers of nondelinquents were higher than mothers of delinquents. These findings were similar to those of Holstein (1972), who found in her study of nondelinquent eighth graders and their parents that higher stages of parental reasoning tended to be associated with more mature moral judgment in children. Other factors in her study which also related significantly to moral judgment levels in children were warmth and degree of involvement of parents with their youngsters.

Fodor's 1973 study of psychopathic and nonpsychopathic delinquents revealed a lower level of moral reasoning in psychopathic youngsters, and Fodor also found relationships with several other parental behavior antecedents. Psychopaths in his study saw their fathers as less nurturant and as giving less praise; mothers of psychopaths were found to

demand less achievement of their sons than mothers of nonpsychopathic youths.

Jurkovic and Prentice (1974) considered both moral judgment levels and moral interaction in delinquent and nondelinquent families. The expected direction of higher moral judgment level for mothers was affirmed, but no significant differences were found in level of moral judgment for the two types of families. Again, important correlates of moral reasoning were noted in the delinquent and nondelinquent families. Delinquent family interactions were higher on dominance, hostility, and conflict; nondelinquent families were higher on warmth and tended to show more encouragement. There was no significant difference in complexity nor in interaction, a measure which might be assumed to contribute to cognitive aspects of moral reasoning. The family interaction variables were tested in a moral discussion among all family members, in which joint agreement on a Kohlberg moral dilemma was the task.

Campagna and Harter (1975) found the moral reasoning of sociopathic children less mature than that of normal children matched for mental age at two age levels, 10 and 13, with cognitive development, intelligence, and social class controlled. The sociopathic boys involved in this study were residents of a state treatment center for children manifesting different types of psychopathology. Characteristics used to define sociopathic behavior included antisocial and strongly impulsive behavior, pathological lying, vandalism, truancy, and poor school performance.

Using Piagetian intention stories, Eschel et al. (1968) measured the moral reasoning of a group of 68 lower class institutionalized boys at three institutions, and compared their findings with those of a sample of 819 controls from two schools in an underprivileged area of Tel Aviv. This group of 819 had been part of an earlier study by the same researchers. From the group of 819, the subgroup of 98 low-income students was also extracted for further comparison. Age ranges in all groups were 12-16. Mature responses by subjects were judged to be those where more weight was given to intention of the characters in the stories presented than to the outcomes. The normal sample was significantly more mature than both lower class samples on every comparison; however, although a trend toward greater moral maturity was found in the lower class control group, the difference between them and the delinquents was not significant. Both lower class samples tended to do poorly on the intentionality dimension, and there was a greater preference for results as the governing criterion in moral judgment in the delinquent group. This is similar to Kohlberg's findings that delinquents reasoned more often at preconventional stages than non-delinquents. The results of this study would seem to indicate that social class may have a stronger relationship to mature moral reasoning than deviant behavior, a finding which Kay (1975) explored and supported extensively from his review of the literature on moral behavior. The cross-cultural comparison done in this study, radical difference in subgroup sizes, and other severe methodological problems may have affected the outcome and should be considered.

In Fodor's 1972 study, 40 delinquent adolescent males who had been involved in the courts for violations ranging from petty larceny to attempted homicide were matched with 40 nondelinquent males. Age, race, verbal intelligence, and mother's education were controlled in the study. Delinquents received significantly lower moral judgment scores than controls with all nine of Kohlberg's original moral dilemmas as the measure.

Finally, Scharf et al. (1973) reported on their findings for delinquency in an ongoing prison study where moral discussions based on Kohlberg's theory are being used to stimulate higher levels of moral reasoning. The authors indicated that their initial findings showed delinquents at consistently lower levels of moral judgment than controls, but that these levels were not fixed and that moral reasoning patterns could be stimulated through moral education programs to higher levels. School programs in moral education (Fenton, 1976; Kohlberg, 1975a; Wasserman, 1976) are also being used to promote such moral growth, but so far no published findings for delinquent or disruptive youth have appeared.

These studies have shown at least moderate support for lower levels of moral reasoning in delinquent subjects when compared to nondelinquents. The findings for family and socioeconomic influences, however, suggest that moral judgment is only one factor in the complex etiology of delinquency. Therefore, this researcher sought a more direct comparison of moral judgment levels with overt behavior. The student who had demonstrated persistent disruption in a school setting was the focus,

with disruption in its varying forms which led to disciplinary referral assumed to be a partial indication of moral maturity or irresponsibility. It was hoped that in focusing on a group of students whose behavior was somewhat deviant from school norms, but who had not been incarcerated, the complexities of delinquent etiology would be avoided so that the relationship of moral judgment to action would be more apparent. Although such a study has not been done previously in a school setting with teachers included in the interviewing, some researchers have attempted to establish a relationship between moral judgment on Kohlberg's scale and action in the moral domain.

Haan et al. (1968) studied groups of college students and Peace Corps volunteers using Kohlberg's interview and scale. Moral maturity was related to measures of political and social activism and to family and personality correlates. As predicted, principled subjects were most activist in this study, showing willingness to participate in civil disobedience (including protest) when they felt it appropriate. The views of principled (postconventional) subjects were also found to be more discrepant from their parents than those of conventional subjects. A less-expected finding in this study was that a high percentage of Stage 2 preconventional subjects were also high on activism. Kohlberg (1970a) originally attributed this to value confusion typically experienced by college students resulting in possible regression effects in moral reasoning. Self-serving desire for crowd conformity has also been discussed as a contributing explanation (Keniston, 1970; Smith, 1969).

Kohlberg (1976a) later rejected the notion of a reversal in moral stage reasoning indicated by his initial analysis of the Haan et al. data, and attributed the apparent backward shift to faults within the interview scoring system at that time.

A serious criticism of sampling technique in the Haan et al. study has been made by Kurtines and Grief (1974). After the initial group of subjects were interviewed with Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, only those subjects who could be classified as pure stage types (50 percent responses at one stage, no more than 25 percent at any other stage--a definition now obsolete in the new scoring system) were retained in the study, resulting in elimination of 46 percent of the original sample from the final data analysis (p. 459). Haan et al. mentioned this problem in their discussion, but rather than seeing it as a hindrance, they saw it as a conservative influence on the outcome, since the addition of the deleted subjects might have provided even stronger findings in the direction hypothesized.

Kohlberg refers to his own unpublished work with Krebs (Kohlberg, 1975a) as an example of the relationship of judgment and behavior. Following the format of some of the earlier resistance-to-temptation studies, Kohlberg and Krebs measured moral judgment of a sample of students, then placed them in a situation where it was possible to cheat. Only 15 percent of the students showing some principled reasoning in this study cheated when placed in a situation to do so, while 55 percent of the conventional and 70 percent of the preconventional subjects cheated (p. 672).

To investigate a judgment and behavior correlation, Kohlberg (1970a; 1971c) also interviewed a sample of 34 Yale undergraduates from Milgram's pilot studies on obedience. Milgram (1974) discussed Kohlberg's findings ("suggestive, though not very strong") that subjects who refused to shock the victim and thus disobeyed were at a higher level of moral development than those who remained obedient (p. 205). Referring to the Milgram analysis, Kohlberg (1970a) stated that only the thinking of Stage 6 "clearly defined the situation as one in which the experimenter did not have the moral right to ask them to inflict pain on another person" (p. 78). Thus, 75 percent of those interviewed who were at Stage 6 quit the experiment or refused to shock the victim, while only 13 percent of those at lower stages did so (p. 78). A problem in this sort of data analysis that is prevalent in research on moral stages is that very few subjects at postconventional stages were identified compared to those at conventional and preconventional stages; thus, the percentages represent vastly different numbers of total subjects.

In his later discussion of the Milgram studies and the implications for a relationship of judgment and action in morality, Kohlberg (1971c) also cited several problems in moral education which have a direct bearing on the present study. He indicated that teachers often concentrate on moralizing over trivial classroom routines rather than about moral issues which have meaning outside the classroom, and that when teachers do make behavioral demands that are truly moral in nature, children often have not developed the moral values themselves which

require such behavior (pp. 80-81). This idea of the mismatch and qualitative difference between adults and children is derived directly from the structuralist approach to moral development of Piaget (1932). Kohlberg (1971c) criticized present approaches to moral education by stating it is the "over-concern with conforming behaviour characteristic of traditional approaches to moral education that lies behind most of the mistakes of education in the moral realm" (p. 81). This statement has important implications for the present research, since this study was designed to compare teacher moral judgment with moral judgment of both identified problem students in their classes and those whom they have not identified as such. It could be that disruptive students' deviations from such conforming behavior are what cause them to be considered problems, rather than any inherent difference in moral maturity.

Summary of the Literature and Implications for this Research

It is not well established that there are relationships between moral judgment and moral behavior. Kohlberg himself seems to be of two minds, stating somewhat inconsistently that the "concept of morality is itself a philosophical (ethical) rather than a behavioral concept" (1971b, p. 152), but that moral judgment is the "single most important or influential factor yet discovered in moral behavior" (1975a, p. 672).

Research studies to date in which a relationship of moral judgment and behavior was sought have been carried out almost exclusively with

adolescents or adults showing extreme forms of deviancy (adjudicated delinquents, psychopaths, or sociopaths). Few studies involved normal subjects in natural settings; those that did have been criticized methodologically (Eschel et al., 1968; Haan et al., 1968) or have been incompletely reported as in Kohlberg's analysis of the Milgram subjects (Kohlberg, 1970a, 1971c; Milgram, 1974). In this study, a clear definition of disruptive or problem behavior was sought in a natural setting, in the school. Kohlberg (1958) attempted to do this with his original subjects, but only as a side aspect of his research. In other words, the teacher rating of students on measures of "reliable conformity" occurred only after his student subjects had already been chosen, and the students low on the teacher evaluation represented a small subgroup.

Since Kohlberg's contention that moral judgment is the most influential factor yet isolated in moral behavior (1975a, p. 672) could have powerful implications for teachers attempting to explain and deal with the behavior of disruptive (morally immature) students, this study was designed to provide further research validation for this assumption. Differentiating moral judgment levels of two clearly defined groups of students--disruptive and nondisruptive--was the major purpose of the study rather than a secondary investigation. The findings could support the trends reported in the literature which show the moral reasoning of deviant youngsters to be less mature than that of nondeviant youngsters, or they could fail to support such a trend.

The findings would have wider application than those of deliquency studies, since the students studied are typical of those actively involved in the everyday school setting.

There have been no studies dealing specifically with teachers' moral stages, and the present study was proposed to include teachers. Aside from teacher assessment of student behavior (Bull, 1967; Kohlberg, 1958), the role of teacher stage of moral reasoning has not been considered as a possible factor in referral of certain students as behavior problems. Kohlberg (1971c) discussed the problem of student/teacher mismatch in moral expectation, and the qualitative difference of adult and child moral reasoning is fundamental to Piaget's structuralist view of cognitive and moral development (Piaget, 1932; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), but the nature of adult/child interaction has been considered only in the parent and family studies, not with the teacher as the adult influence. This researcher has attempted to fill the gap both in the literature of cognitive-developmental moral judgment study and in the literature which has focused on unraveling the mysteries of the "hidden curriculum" in school classrooms (Jackson, 1968; Kohlberg, 1966, 1970b, 1971c, 1975a, 1975b; Kohlberg & Whitten, 1972).

In summary, research to date shows rather weak support for Kohlberg's contention that moral judgment is a primary influence in moral behavior. Delinquency studies have provided some support for a relationship of moral judgment and behavior, but because of the extreme nature of disturbance of some of the subjects (identified sociopathic and psychopathic behavior, for instance), the findings could as easily be

attributed to many other causal factors, including the incarceration experience, in many cases, as to underlying maturity or immaturity in moral thinking and reasoning processes. This study was designed to look at a more realistic comparison of moral reasoning processes and disruptive or irresponsible moral behavior.

Teachers were included in this study because they are the primary adult influences in the school situation, because their input from moral thinking processes has not been assessed in studies previously, and because it is their level of moral judgment which may interact with the moral judgment levels of both problem and nonproblem students in the school situation. This interaction may be a contributing factor to the referral and classification of behavior problem students.

Methodology was designed to be more straightforward in the present study than that reported previously in the judgment/behavior investigations, as the next chapter will indicate.

CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY

Based on the review of the literature, the following hypotheses were developed for this study:

1.) Nondisruptive students will show higher levels of moral reasoning than disruptive students as measured by Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview.

This hypothesis was suggested by the findings reported in Kohlberg and Freundlich's study (in preparation) and by others studying the correlation of deviant behavior and moral judgment (Fodor, 1972, 1973).

2.) Teachers will show higher levels of moral reasoning than eighth grade male students as measured by Kohlberg's instrument.

This hypothesis was suggested by the findings of a +.71 correlation of age and level of moral judgment reported by Kohlberg (1976a) and by the findings of other researchers investigating the relationship of moral stage and age (Rest, Turiel & Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1966).

3.) Demographic characteristics of age, achievement level, socio-economic factors, and school attended in the student population will show positive relationships to moral judgment level.

This hypothesis was suggested by the original data of Kohlberg's 1958 study, his longitudinal reanalysis of this data from then until the present (Kohlberg, 1975a, 1976a), and by Kay's works (1968; 1975).

4.) Moral judgment levels of nondisruptive students will be closer to moral judgment levels of teachers than moral judgment levels of disruptive students are to those of teachers.

This hypothesis was derived from the combined findings presented in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2.

The remaining hypothesis is stated in null form because no clear research directions emerged from the review.

5.) No relationship will be found between demographic factors--sex, race, length of teaching experience, educational level, and subject area taught--and moral judgment levels of teachers.

Preliminary Procedures

Before sampling was done in schools, permission was obtained from the superintendent of schools and the head of the research department in the school district where the research was to be carried out. The head of special programs (which included the behavior adjustment program) was then contacted for information and recommendations as to typical schools in the district which would be representative of the total school population in the area and whose principals would cooperate in the research.

Based on these recommendations, three junior high schools were selected. The principals of these schools were then contacted, and all three agreed to allow the proposed research to be carried out. Schools A and B were located within the city limits (but near the periphery) of an urban area of approximately 500,000 residents. School C was within the city limits of an adjacent community which served a similar population. Schools B and C served a predominantly suburban area with less than one percent black students in each; more than 99 percent of the students were Caucasian in each school. School A encompassed a suburban area and an area closer to the center of town, and student breakdown was 74.6 percent Caucasian, 25.3 percent black. School C served the highest socioeconomic area, with Schools A and B serving somewhat lower socioeconomic areas. The range was primarily lower to upper middle class for all three schools, however. (This information and these statistics were obtained from the district school office and from administrative personnel within the schools; the researcher agreed to keep the identity of the specific schools, personnel, subjects, and the district itself confidential.)

Subjects

Subjects for this study were 30 teachers and 60 male Caucasian eighth grade students chosen from three junior high schools in an urban area of a southeastern state. Students were further divided into two subgroups--30 students identified as problem or disruptive and 30 control students not so identified.

Random sampling was carried out within each school to obtain the teacher sample. Since all student subjects were eighth graders, only seventh and eighth grade teachers were included in the population sampled, these being the teachers who were presently working or had most recently worked with the target student group. A total of 10 names were drawn at each of the three schools, using a table of random numbers. Table 1 shows demographic characteristics of the teachers.

Table 1.--Demographic characteristics of teachers

Factor	Frequency	Factor	Frequency
Sex		Race	
Male	15	Caucasian	21
Female	15	Black	9
Total	30	Total	30
Education Level		Subject Taught	
B. A.	19	English/Reading/ Social Studies	13
M. A.	11	Science/Math	12
Total	30	Other Areas	5
		Total	30

Subject areas taught included English, reading, social studies, science, math, physical education, industrial arts, and business education. For simplification of the data, these areas were grouped in

three categories; the first included English, reading, and social studies, the second included science and math, and the third included all other areas. In the "Other" category were three physical education teachers and one teacher each of industrial arts and business education. The average length of teaching experience in the teacher sample was 13.2 years, with a range from two to 32 years of experience.

Student sampling was done randomly at two of the junior high schools (Schools A and B); at the third (School C), a guidance counselor obtained names of a sample of 38 students from the three counselors working with eighth graders. The researcher was not initially allowed access to any lists or information on students at this school because of concern over possible violation of the right to privacy. A total of 10 students identified as problems and 28 students not so identified from average and lower achievement level classes were provided to the researcher for further sampling. Guidance counselors designated which were problem students and which were not, based on their referral for problems of disciplinary action or the absence of such referral.

In the two schools where random sampling was done, a list of all eighth grade Caucasian males was made from schedule cards and computerized class rosters. A guidance counselor and student dean (School B) and an adjustment class teacher (School A) then identified those students who had been on the rolls of behavior adjustment classes the

previous year* or who had been referred on several occasions for disciplinary action during the present year by teachers. Ten names were drawn from each list, using a table of random numbers.

At the third school (School C), only 10 names of problem students were provided for the study. Twenty-eight names of nonproblem students were provided, and 10 of these were drawn, using a table of random numbers.

Teachers whose names were selected were contacted personally by the researcher. The nature and purpose of the research was explained, along with the sampling procedure, and teachers were asked if they would agree to be interviewed.

Addresses and parent names for the student sample were obtained from information cards kept by the school. A letter explaining the nature and purpose of the research and requesting parental informed consent was mailed to the parents of each student in the sample. A consent form to be mailed back to the school and a stamped envelope were sent to each set of parents. They were asked to sign and return the consent form whether they agreed to have their son participate or not. (See Appendix C, for copies of the information letter to parents and informed consent forms for student and teacher subjects.)

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*NOTE: At the time of this study, behavior adjustment classes as originally set up in the district were being phased out, while a combination program for learning disabled and emotionally disturbed youngsters was being developed. Thus, students were drawn from the adjustment class rolls of the previous school year when the program was still in operation.

Parents who did not return the forms were contacted by phone, where possible, and additional students were sampled in the same manner as that previously described until a total of 60 students were obtained. Because the disruptive population was limited, four students from an alternative public school serving the entire county were used as replacements for students who were not willing to participate or whose parents refused permission. This alternative school was located within the same urban area as Schools A and B, but served students throughout the county. For purposes of data analysis, these students were included in the School B group, since they were most like the students from this school in demographic characteristics. Table 2 shows the attrition record of both the students and teacher subjects which resulted in the final sample.

Table 2.--Attrition record of potential student and teacher subjects

Reason for elimination	Potential disruptive students N = 37	Potential controls N = 40	Potential teachers N = 32
Failed to return informed consent	4	6	
Parents refused consent	2	2	
Did not wish to participate (Students)	1	2	
Did not wish to participate (Teachers)			2
Total eliminated	7	10	2
Remaining for sample	30	30	30

A 79 percent overall return in the student population and a 94 percent acceptance rate among teachers were obtained.

Table 3 shows the breakdown by school membership of the final student and teacher samples.

Table 3.--School membership of students and teachers

School	Teachers	Disruptive students	Controls
School A	10	8	11
School B	10	10	10
School C	10	8	9
Alternative school		4*	
Totals	30	30	30

*Students from the alternative school were grouped with School B for data analysis.

The different cell sizes among the student groups were brought about by varying response rates in the schools.

The technique of random sampling contributes to the external validity of research studies. Randomization should also control for variables of socioeconomic status and academic achievement. The nature of the two student samples, however, suggested the possibility of bias. Because of the limited population from which problem students were sampled and because students with low achievement and from low socioeconomic backgrounds have been over represented in behavior problem

samples in past studies (see Kay, 1975), the researcher felt that achievement and socioeconomic status would not be completely controlled in the sampling process, and additional measures of these factors were sought.

Since parent permission to utilize students' school records was not solicited in this study, only broad general measures of achievement and socioeconomic status for the student subjects were obtained. Schools A and B had several academic tracks, and students were identified as either "basic" or "average" according to this tracking. School C had eliminated tracking, but guidance counselors were able to identify those students who had been in the two groupings the previous year. In the disruptive student sample, 17 students were classified as "basic," while 13 were"average." In the nondisruptive sample, 10 students were classified as "basic," and 20 were classified as "average."

A measure of socioeconomic status for the student group was obtained from their area of neighborhood residence using the 1970 census reports of the United States government. Student addresses were located on an area map using reference lists kept at the county courthouse, then they were further located on the area maps of the United States 1970 census reports (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971). From this location, average property value of the neighborhood in which each student lived was obtained, and these were used in continuous form. Property values ranged from a low of $9,300 to a high of $43,000 with a

mean of $18,272. Mean property value was $18,240 for the disruptive and $18,303 for the nondisruptive group. For the several students living in apartments, value of property in their immediate area was used, and the one student whose address could not be located on the area or census map was assigned to the mean for the total student sample.

Age range of the total student sample was 13.0 to 15.2, with a mean age of 13.0. Age range of the disruptive sample was 13.1 to 15.2, with mean age of 13.7. Age range of the control student sample was 13.0 to 15.1,with a mean age of 13.5.

A direct correspondence between teachers and students in the sample was not sought; in other words, students and teachers were sampled independently, without regard to whether students were in the classes of the teachers at the present time. Of the total sample, however, all but two of the students (representing a percentage of 97 percent of the student sample) were currently in a class with at least one of the teachers.

Procedures for Data Collection

After permission was received, each subject was interviewed using Form A of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview (Kohlberg et al.,1976), which includes three hypothetical moral dilemmas. A copy of the interview is in Appendix B. A description of the instrument, including reports of reliability and validity, is given in the next section of this chapter.

All subjects were interviewed during the school day or immediately before or after school, and all interviews were carried out on the school grounds. Teachers were interviewed first in each school, then students. Interviewing was carried out over a period of three months from October to January, with the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays intervening. Teachers were interviewed at a time determined by them--at planning periods and before or after school. Students were taken from subject classes by permission of teachers; no student was taken from a physical education class.

All interviewing was done by the researcher, who had attended the August 1976 workshop on interviewing and scoring procedures presented by Kohlberg and his colleagues at Harvard University. Although the interviewer had available the group membership of the individuals being interviewed, a deliberate attempt was made to avoid direct identification of problem and nonproblem students at the time of interviewing. Students were interviewed in the order that their consent forms were returned. Considerable time elapsed between interviewing and coding of the protocols (carried out in February and March), transcription of the protocols was done by number only and was carried out by a secretary unfamiliar with the purpose of the investigation, and protocols were coded in random order. In these ways, bias of the interviewer/coder was avoided, since initial interviewing could not be done totally "blind." Since cognitive-developmental theory is based on process and structure rather than content of moral reasoning, experimenter bias is not considered a serious threat.

At the time of the interview, the interviewer introduced herself to the subject, briefly described the study being carried out, and told the subjects that there were no right or wrong answers to the stories and questions being presented and that only their ideas or opinions were sought. The interviewer then read each dilemma (see Appendix B) and the questions associated with it. All questions and responses were recorded on audio tape. Following the interview, demographic data were collected from teachers, and students were asked to give their age, birthdate, and to discuss their favorite subjects in school. Both teachers and students were asked to predict how they thought the other group would respond to each dilemma and why. The last two procedures were carried out mainly for reduction of tension following the more formal interview situation. Responses were written down by the researcher, but not tape-recorded. The total time of each interview (including pre- and post interview discussion) was determined by length of the respondents' answers to the questions, and the interviews averaged about 20-30 minutes.

After the interviewing was completed, tapes were transcribed by a secretarial assistant for coding. No coding was done until all protocols had been collected and transcribed. The researcher coded all protocols in random order, using the Form A scoring manual (Kohlberg et al., 1976). Although teacher and student protocols could be discriminated, the coder was virtually "blind" to differentiation of disruptive or nondisruptive student protocols, due to the large number and length of protocols (an average of five to seven typed

pages each) and to the amount of time which elapsed between interviewing and coding (two to four months). Protocols were scored using the current criterion method which yields a moral maturity score which can be matched against Kohlberg's stage hierarchy. Details of the procedures for scoring are discussed in the next section.

Instrumentation

Form A of the 1976 version of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview (see Appendix A) was used to measure moral maturity in this study. The current interview and scoring format (Kohlberg et al., 1976) represent major revisions from earlier versions. The earlier methods are not relevant to the current study except as the current results are placed in context with earlier cognitive-developmental moral judgment research. Kohlberg gives a complete discussion of the changes through which his instrument has progressed since 1958 in his most recent article (Kohlberg, 1976a), and the current manual also details the history of the instrument (Kohlberg et al., 1976).

The scoring of the current instrument involves three levels--moral issues, moral concerns, and criterion concepts. These three levels grow out of Kohlberg's six-stage hierarchy which may be described generally as follows (Kohlberg et al., 1976):

> Stage 1 - Heteronomous - Right is blind obedience to rules and authority, avoiding punishment, and not doing physical harm.

Stage 2 - Right is serving one's own needs and making fair deals in terms of concrete exchange.

Stage 3 - The right is playing a good (nice) role, being concerned about other people and their feelings, keeping loyalty and trust with partners, and being motivated to follow rules and expectations.

Stage 4 - The Social System and Conscience Stage - The right is doing one's duty to society, upholding the social order, and the welfare of society or the group.

Stage 5 - The Stage of Social Contract or Utility and of Individual Rights - The right is upholding the basic rights, values, and legal contracts of a society, even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of the group.

Stage 6 - The Stage of Universal Ethical Principles - Guidance by universal ethical principles which all humanity should follow. (pp. 14-20)

There are six moral issues probed in Form A dilemmas--life, law, punishment and blame, morality and conscience, truth and contract, and affiliative roles and relationships. Areas of moral concern occur within these larger issues. The ten moral concerns are identified by Kohlberg and his colleagues (1976) in six categories, as follows:

A. Welfare
   1. Individual Welfare
   2. Interpersonal and group welfare
B. Character and sanctions
   3. Character and motives
   4. Sanctions
C. Normative order
   5. Rulefulness
   6. Role norms and obligations
D. Commutative justice orientation
   7. Reciprocity
   8. Contracts, agreements and trust
E. Justice and fairness
   9. Liberty and autonomy
   10. Fairness and equity (pp. 24-25)

Moral concerns are reflected in the matching criterion concepts in the scoring manual. The coder first identifies the issue, then the concern and moral stage of codable statements. A criterion concept is the "reasoning pattern that is most distinctive of a given stage" and thus follows from the structural definition of stages (Kohlberg, 1976a, p. 45).

The current interview is more standardized in terms of questions and therefore responses than earlier versions. Structure is emphasized in coding of responses rather than content. Kohlberg summarized the work culminating in the present instrument and manual by stating (Kuhmerker, 1976):

> With the Standardized Scoring Manual and its validation on the longitudinal data we are completing a task that has taken over twenty years, which is to define structural moral stages and to demonstrate their existance empirically as something culturally universal. (p. 5)

Validity, Reliability, and Interjudge Agreement

Kohlberg reports a correlation of +.71 between chronological age and moral judgment maturity in his longitudinal study (1976a), but he rejects the notion of validation of his instrument by the age-stage criterion (p. 46). Kohlberg favors construct validity to assess a moral development measure, and he defines this construct validity as "the fit of data obtained to primary components of its theoretical definition" (p. 46). According to Kohlberg, invariant sequence should be the criterion sought in validating a moral development measure. Kohlberg cites a study in preparation which validates this criterion (see Kohlberg, 1976a).

The other dimension of construct validity is an ethical or philosophical dimension, according to Kohlberg. This dimension involves "the requirement that a higher moral stage be a philosophically more adequate way of reasoning about moral dilemmas than a lower stage" (p. 46). Kohlberg (1971b, 1973) claims that this is true in his hierarchy--that each stage indeed represents a more adequate way of reasoning when judged by moral and philosophic criteria. Prediction to an outside criterion is not meaningful to Kohlberg, and he considers only internal structural consistency to be important (1976a).

Test-retest reliability data from past studies were summarized by Kohlberg et al. (1976) in the most recent scoring manual. In one study, a reliability coefficient of .84 was obtained for 13 subjects retested after one year. In another study of 20 subjects, 94 percent were within one third of the stage and 88 percent were at the same stage at time of retesting (interval not stated) (p. 39). The studies from which these coefficients were derived are part of the forthcoming book by Kohlberg and Turiel (in preparation). They are reliability estimates for previous versions of the instrument, but are presented here in support of the evolving instrument.

In the present study, interjudge agreement measures were obtained, but true reliability (see Herbert & Attridge, 1975) of the instrument as a measure was not obtained. The reliability of Kohlberg's instrument was accepted on the basis of past studies, and interobserver agreement was measured as an indication of what Herbert and Attridge (1975) called

"the structure, focus, and procedures of the system, and as measures of observer bias or the ambiguity of observed events" (p. 14). In this case, the "observed events" were the interview responses themselves.

A random sample of 20 transcribed protocols were sent to the Moral Education Center at Harvard for scoring. These were then compared to the scoring of the researcher for the same protocols and a percentage of interjudge agreement was derived. Of the 20 protocols evaluated, 85 percent were in agreement within one third of a stage (33 points in a range of 100 for each stage) and 75 percent were in agreement within one fourth of a stage (25 points out of 100). Agreement within one fourth to one third of a stage is considered adequate by the scorers at the Moral Education Center, and they use this criterion when measuring interjudge agreement (Colby, 1977) among themselves. Since the researcher and the co-rater were totally independent, never having worked together and separated by considerable distance, the percentage of agreement obtained was considered satisfactory. The co-rater at Harvard also had access to later revisions of the scoring manual which the researcher did not have available, yet high agreement on moral maturity was still found. When assessed statistically, a Pearson correlation coefficient of .94 was obtained as a measure of interjudge agreement.

Test-retest reliability was not evaluated in this study, although Form B of the moral dilemmas is available in the current manual to

provide opportunity for this. Such reliability data would be useful in experimental studies, but the researcher did not deem it necessary for the present associational study.

Treatment of Data

After coding of all protocols was completed, the following data for each subject were analyzed: moral maturity scores, group membership (teacher, disruptive student, nondisruptive student), and demographic characteristics of age, achievement rating, socioeconomic status, and school attended for students, and sex, race, length of teaching experience, educational level, school taught in, and subject area taught for teachers.

Correlation matrices were obtained which utilized all of the variables listed above, and based on these, multiple regression analyses were done for total teacher and student group, for the total student group, for each student subgroup, and for teachers. With moral maturity scores as the dependent variable, regression equations were set up to answer the following questions:

1.) Does group membership--teacher, disruptive student, and nondisruptive student--predict moral maturity level as measured by Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview? (Hypotheses 1, 2, 4)

2.) Do demographic characteristics of teachers and students predict moral maturity level as measured by Kohlberg's interview? (Hypotheses 3, 5)

Both free entry and hierarchical regression techniques were used. Through the hierarchical technique, the variance accounted for by each predictor variable was calculated at the last step of each phase of the analysis after all other variables had been entered. This has the effect of testing the significance of the variable under question, holding all others constant.

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Multiple Regression Analysis (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, & Bent, 1975) was used in the University of Florida computing system, and hypotheses were tested at the .05 level of significance for the *F* ratios generated.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

In order to test the hypotheses, five separate multiple regression analyses were carried out, with moral judgment scores (MJ) as the criterion. First, moral judgment was evaluated as a function of group membership (GR)--teacher, disruptive student, and nondisruptive student--and school membership (SCH), the two independent variables held in common by the three groups. Next, the two student groups were compared, and each student group was analyzed separately in order to examine the effects of the demographic characteristics of students on moral judgment levels and to test for significance of difference between disruptive and nondisruptive students. The additional independent variables assessed for students were age (AGE), academic rating (ACAD), and socioeconomic status (SES). Finally, teachers were analyzed separately in order to examine the effects of their demographic characteristics not held in common with students on moral judgment level. These independent variables were sex (SEX), race (R), length of teaching experience (EX), educational level (ED), and subject area taught (SUB).

Dummy coding was used to code variables of group membership--GR(D) = disruptive, GR(N) = nondisruptive, GR(T) = teachers--and

school membership--SCH(A), SCH(B), SCH(C)--in the total group analysis, academic rating in the student groups, and sex, race, educational level, and subject area taught--SUB(1) = English/Social Studies/Reading, SUB(2) = Math/Science, SUB(3) = other areas--in the teacher group. Where three categories of a variable are present, the analysis generates correlation coefficients and B and beta weights and their associated standard error and F ratios only for the groups coded with 1's--GR(D), GR(N), SCH(A), SCH(C), SUB(1), and SUB(2) in this analysis. Information about relationships between the variables coded with 0's--GR(T), SCH(B), SUB(3) in this analysis--is included in the F test performed on the R square variance accounted for from the point before the first coded variable enters the anlysis to the point where the second coded variable enters.

Table 4 shows means, standard deviations, and ranges of moral judgment scores for each of the three groups taken separately, for the total student group, and for the total of all three groups taken together.

Table 4.--Means, standard deviations, and ranges of moral judgment scores for all subjects

Group	N	Mean	Standard deviation	Range
Teachers	30	334.90	57.32	250-492
Total students	60	209.13	33.13	150-273
Disruptive (30)		194.30	26.73	156-260
Nondisruptive (30)		223.97	32.60	150-273
Total group	90	251.06	73.16	150-492

Simple correlation coefficients, B weights, beta weights, standard error of the B weights, F ratios, multiple correlation coefficients, prediction equations, and amounts of variance accounted for by each independent variable were derived from the data in order to test the hypotheses.

Findings for the Hypotheses

The first hypothesis stated that nondisruptive students would show higher levels of moral reasoning than disruptive students as measured by Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview. This hypothesis was supported.

Table 5 shows the correlation matrix for the two student groups.

Table 5.--Correlation coefficients for total student group

	MJ	SCH(A)	SCH(C)	GR	AGE	ACAD	SES
MJ	1.00	-0.11	0.15	-0.45*	-0.13	0.08	0.05
SCH(A)		1.00	-0.43*	-0.11	0.07	-0.10	-0.01
SCH(C)			1.00	-0.04	-0.29*	0.42*	0.28*
GR				1.00	0.22	-0.30*	-0.01
AGE					1.00	-0.32*	-0.19
ACAD						1.00	0.28*
SES							1.00

$p < .05$, $N = 60$

The only moderate correlation of interest was that of moral judgment and group membership (r = -.45). Slight correlations were also shown between group membership and academic rating (r = -.30) and between age and academic rating (r = -.32). Other moderate and slight correlations were not relevant to the present study.

Table 6 shows B weights, beta weights, standard error of the B weights, and F ratios for the total student group, including all disruptive and nondisruptive students.

Table 6.--Relation of group membership and demographic variables to moral judgment for total student group

	B weights	Beta weights	Std. error of B	F
SCH(A)	-8.937	-0.127	9.453	0.894
SCH(C)	8.974	0.123	10.938	0.673
SES	0.254	0.048	0.675	0.142
ACAD	-10.355	-0.157	9.413	1.120
AGE	-1.211	-0.021	7.347	0.027
GR	-3.672	-0.503	0.935	15.414*
(Constant)	247.161			

*P < .001, N = 60

Based on these data, the following prediction equation was generated for the total student group:

$$MJ = 247.16 - 8.94SCH(A) + 8.97SCH(C) + 0.25SES - 1.21AGE - 10.36\ ACAD - 3.57GR$$

Group membership accounted for 20 percent of the variance in moral judgment when entered alone ($F = 14.86$ with 1,59 df, $p < .001$) at the first step in the analysis, and total school membership (Schools A, B, C) accounted for only an additional 3 percent of the variance in moral judgment ($F = 1.07$ with 2,57 df, not significant). A multiple R of .50 was obtained at the last step of the analysis; the variable of primary interest, group membership, accounted for a unique variance of 22 percent in moral judgment level. The unique variance accounted for by each of the other independent variables at the last step of the analysis (with all other variables entered) was as follows: academic rating, 1 percent, age and socioeconomic status, less than 1 percent each.

The second hypothesis stated that teachers would show higher levels of moral reasoning than eighth grade male students (disruptive and nondisruptive) as measured by Kohlberg's instrument. This hypothesis was also supported.

Table 7 shows the correlations of moral judgment with the variables reflecting group membership and school membership, the only variables held in common by the three groups--teachers, disruptive students, and nondisruptive students.

Table 7.--Correlation coefficients for total teacher and student groups

	MJ	SCH(A)	SCH(C)	GR(D)	GR(N)
MJ	1.00	0.01	0.13	-0.55*	-0.26*
SCH(A)		1.00	-0.45*	-0.08	-0.07
SCH(C)			1.00	-0.05	0.00
GR(D)				1.00	-0.50*
GR(N)					1.00

$p < .05$, $N = 90$

With all three groups in the analysis, the simple correlation of disruptive group membership and moral judgment was -.55 and the correlation of nondisruptive group membership and moral judgment was -.26. The other correlations were not relevant to this study.

Table 8 shows the B weights, beta weights, standard error of the B, and F ratios at the last step of the total group analysis, including all subjects--teachers, disruptive students, and nondisruptive students.

Table 8.--Relation of group and school membership to moral judgment in the total teacher and student groups

	B weights	Beta weights	Std. error of B	F
GR(D)	-139.236	-0.902	10.652	170.870*
GR(N)	-110.545	-0.716	10.590	108.957*
SCH(A)	4.398	-0.028	10.439	0.177
SCH(C)	16.059	0.101	10.622	2.286
(Constant)	328.081			

*$p < .001$, $N = 90$

Based on these data, the following prediction equation was generated for the total teacher and student groups:

MJ = 328.08 - 139.24GR(D) - 110.54GR(N) + 4.40SCH(A) + 16.06SCH(C)

When only group membership had been entered into the analysis, it accounted for 69 percent of the variance in moral judgment ($F = 100.00$ with 2,97 df, $p < .001$); when school membership entered, it accounted for only an additional 1 percent of the variance in the criterion ($F = 1.42$ with 2,85 df, not significant).

With all the independent variables shared in common by teachers and students in the analysis, an overall F ratio of 49.625 (with 4,89 df, $p < .001$) was obtained, but only group membership showed a significant relationship to the criterion ($F = 170.870$ with 1,89 df, $p < .001$ for the disruptive group and $F = 108.957$ with 1,89 df,

$p < .001$ for the nondisruptive group). A multiple R of .84 was obtained at the last step of the analysis.

The third hypothesis stated that demographic characteristics of age, achievement level, socioeconomic status, and school membership would show relationships to moral judgment level. As indicated in Table 6, this hypothesis was not supported for the total student group. None of these variables was significantly related to the criterion.

In order to test this hypothesis further, disruptive and nondisruptive groups were analyzed separately. Tables 9 and 10 show the correlation matrices obtained for disruptive and nondisruptive student groups, respectively.

Table 9.--Correlation coefficients for moral judgment and demographic characteristics of disruptive students

	MJ	SCH(A)	SCH(C)	AGE	ACAD	SES
MJ	1.00	0.19	0.02	-0.07	-0.12	-0.10
SCH(A)		1.00	-0.36	-0.24	-0.18	-0.11
SCH(C)			1.00	-0.22	0.43*	0.43*
AGE				1.00	-0.18	-0.12
ACAD					1.00	0.48*
SES						1.00

$p < .05$, $N = 30$

The only moderate correlations of interest for disruptive students were those of academic rating and socioeconomic status ($r = .48$) and membership

in School C with academic rating (r = .43) and socioeconomic status (r = .43). None of these bore a direct relationship to the hypotheses being investigated.

Table 10.--Correlation coefficients for moral judgment and demographic characteristics of nondisruptive students

	MJ	SCH(A)	SCH(C)	AGE	ACAD	SES
MJ	1.00	-0.46*	0.25	-0.02	-0.02	0.15
SCH(A)		1.00	-0.50*	0.36	-0.11	0.07
SCH(C)			1.00	-0.34	0.43*	0.15
AGE				1.00	-0.36	-0.26
ACAD					1.00	0.13
SES						1.00

$P < .05$, $N = 30$

The only moderate correlations of interest for nondisruptive students were those of moral judgment and membership in School A (r = -.46) and academic rating and School C membership (r = .43). Slight correlations also existed between School A membership and age (r = .36), between School C membership and age (r = .34), and between age and academic rating (r = -.36) of nondisruptive students. None of these was of direct interest to this investigation except the correlation of moral judgment and School A membership.

Tables 11 and 12 show B weights, beta weights, standard error of B, and F ratios for disruptive and nondisruptive students, respectively.

Table 11.--Relation of demographic variables to moral judgment for disruptive students

	B weights	Beta weights	Std. error of B	F
SCH(A)	13.760	0.232	13.470	1.044
SCH(C)	11.392	0.192	14.850	0.588
ACAD	-5.760	-0.107	12.677	0.206
SES	-0.485	-0.105	1.086	0.200
AGE	-0.076	-0.002	10.874	0.000
(Constant)	199.795			

N = 30

Based on these data, the following prediction equation was generated for moral judgment levels of disruptive students:

MJ = 199.80 + 13.76SCH(A) + 11.39SCH(C) - 5.76ACAD - 0.49SES - 0.08AGE

Neither the overall F ratio (F = 0.368 with 5,29 df) nor the F ratios for the variables of school membership, academic rating, socioeconomic status, nor age reached significance. At the last step of the analysis, a multiple R of .27 was generated, and unique contributions of the variance in moral judgment explained by variables of academic rating, socioeconomic status and age accounted for less than 1 percent each. Combined school membership accounted for 5 percent of the variance in moral judgment when it entered the equation (F = 0.694 with 2,29 df,

not significant) and School A and School C each contributed less than 2 percent to the unique variance in moral judgment.

Table 12.--Relation of demographic variables to moral judgment for nondisruptive students

	B weights	Beta weights	Std. error of *B*	*F*
SCH(A)	-36.718	-0.552	14.240	6.649*
SCH(C)	2.954	0.422	15.562	0.036
ACAD	-2.875	-0.041	14.008	0.042
SES	1.215	0.254	0.874	1.932
AGE	12.959	0.244	10.835	1.431
(Constant)	41.420			

*$p < .01$, $N = 30$

Based on these data, the following prediction equation was generated for moral judgment levels of nondisruptive students:

$$MJ = 41.42 - 36.72SCH(A) + 2.95SCH(C) - 2.88ACAD + 1.22SES + 12.96AGE$$

The overall *F* ratio did not reach significance at the .05 level ($F = 2.049$ with 5,29 *df*), but the relationship of School A membership to moral judgment level was significant at the .01 level ($F = 6.649$ with 1,29 *df*). School A membership accounted for 19 percent of the unique

variance in moral judgment level, while socioeconomic status accounted for 6 percent, academic rating for 4 percent, and School C membership for less than 1 percent. The relationship of School C membership, academic rating, socioeconomic status, and age to moral judgment level did not reach significance for nondisruptive students.

Because of the finding of a significant difference among the three schools in the moral judgment scores of nondisruptive students, mean moral judgment scores at each school for these students were calculated. Calculation of the means for the three schools verified a difference. The mean for moral judgment at School A was 204.55, while the means for Schools B and C were 236.44 and 234.10, respectively. Thus, School A students were significantly lower than students from the other two schools in moral judgment level.

Hypothesis 3 was rejected for the total student group and for the disruptive subgroups, but was partially accepted for the nondisruptive subgroup. School attended by nondisruptive students did differentiate moral judgment levels, with School A being significantly different from Schools B and C in the lower direction.

The fourth hypothesis stated that moral judgment levels of nondisruptive students would be closer to moral judgment levels of teachers than moral judgment levels of disruptive students and teachers. This hypothesis was supported.

As shown in Table 4, teacher mean moral judgment was 334.90, nondisruptive student mean moral judgment was 223.97, and

disruptive student mean moral judgment was 209.13. Tables 6 and 8 show that nondisruptive and disruptive students differ significantly from each other (nondisruptive students have higher moral judgment scores than disruptive students) and that both student groups are significantly different from the teachers (teachers have higher moral judgment scores than either student group). By implication, the teacher group is closer to the nondisruptive than to the disruptive student group, and this finding is in the predicted direction, although no significance level is attached.

The fifth hypothesis stated that no relationship would be found to exist between teacher demographic characteristics and moral judgment level of teachers. The results of the data analysis failed to reject the null hypothesis. Table 13 shows the teacher correlation matrix.

Table 13.--Correlation coefficients of teacher demographic variables

	MJ	SCH(A)	SCH(C)	SEX	R	EX	ED	SUB(1)	SUB(2)
MJ	1.00	0.11	0.18	-0.06	0.17	0.09	0.22	0.04	-0.19
SCH(A)		1.00	-0.50*	0.00	-0.15	0.64*	0.05	-0.05	0.00
SCH(C)			1.00	0.14	0.15	-0.26	0.20	0.10	0.00
SEX				1.00	0.07	0.03	0.21	-0.07	0.00
R					1.00	-0.02	-0.11	-0.16	0.24
EX						1.00	0.27	-0.04	-0.07
ED							1.00	0.45*	-0.34
SUB(1)								1.00	-0.71*
SUB(2)									1.00

$p < .05$, $N = 30$

The only moderate to strong simple correlations of interest were interactions among the independent variables of school taught in and years of teaching experience (r = .64 for School A and experience) and between education level and subject area taught (r = .45). Since these interactions were not directly related to the overall purposes of the study, they were not investigated further.

Table 14 shows B weights, beta weights, standard error of B, and F ratios for teacher demographic characteristics.

Table 14.--Relation of teacher demographic variables to moral judgment

	B weights	Beta weights	Std. error of B	F
SCH(A)	47.519	0.397	33.048	2.068
SCH(C)	35.662	0.298	27.004	1.744
SEX	-22.932	-0.203	22.164	1.071
R	32.930	0.268	24.348	1.829
EX	-1.494	-0.199	1.986	0.565
ED	34.986	0.299	27.879	1.575
SUB(1)	-46.225	-0.406	33.571	1.896
SUB(2)	-52.020	-0.452	31.752	2.684
(Constant)	343.363			

N = 30

Based on these data, the following prediction equation was generated for teacher variables:

$$MJ = 343.36 + 47.52SCH(A) + 35.66SCH(C) - 22.93SEX + 32.93R - 1.49EX + 34.99ED - 46.23SUB(1) - 52.02SUB(2)$$

The multiple R generated at the last step was .42, but the overall F ratio with all variables in the equation was not significant ($F = 0.986$ with 8,29 df), nor were any of the main effects significant. Unique percentages of variance accounted for by each variable at the last step of the analysis were as follows: subject area taught--SUB(2)--9 percent; subject area taught--SUB(1)--6 percent; School A membership, 7 percent; School C membership, 6 percent; educational level, 5 percent; sex, 4 percent, and length of teaching experience, 2 percent. None of these variances accounted for in moral judgment level was significant. The null hypothesis that teacher demographic variables would not contribute signficantly to moral judgment level was not rejected. The teacher variables of sex, race, educational level, length of teaching experience, and school taught in did not relate significantly to teacher moral judgment level.

Summary of Findings

The following hypotheses developed for this study were tested using multiple regression analysis:

1.) Nondisruptive students will show higher levels of moral reasoning than disruptive students as measured by Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview.

2.) Teachers will show higher levels of moral reasoning than eighth grade male students as measured by Kohlberg's instrument.

3.) Demographic characteristics of age, achievement level, socio-economic status, and school attended in the student population will show positive relationships to moral judgment level.

4.) Moral judgment levels of nondisruptive students will be closer to moral judgment levels of teachers than moral judgment levels of disruptive students are to those of teachers.

5.) No relationship will be found between demographic factors--sex, race, length of teaching experience, educational level, and subject area taught--and moral judgment levels of teachers.

The first and second hypotheses suggesting significant differences between disruptive and nondisruptive students and between teachers and students in moral judgment levels were strongly supported. Likewise, the fourth hypothesis that teacher mean moral judgment would be closer to nondisruptive than to disruptive student mean moral judgment received support.

The third hypothesis suggesting that student age, academic rating, socioeconomic status, and school membership would be significant predictors

of moral judgment was not supported in the total student group nor in the disruptive student subgroup. This hypothesis received partial support in the nondisruptive subgroup; in that group, school membership was a significant predictor of moral judgment level.

The final null hypothesis suggesting that teacher demographic variables of sex, race, teaching experience, educational level, subject area taught, and school taught in would not be significant predictors of teacher moral judgment levels was not rejected. No significant relationships were found between any of the demographic characteristics of teachers measured in this study and their moral judgment level.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

This study was undertaken to discover the relationship among moral judgment levels of disruptive and nondisruptive students and their teachers. In examining such a relationship, the researcher sought to add support to Kohlberg's contention that moral judgment is the most significant factor yet discovered in moral behavior (Kohlberg, 1975a). In addition, a partial contributing factor to the "hidden curriculum" of the classroom was sought in the comparison of teacher moral judgment levels with that of the two student groups. Moral judgment levels of students and their teachers were examined to see if they might be an important component of disruptive and nondisruptive behavior in schools and teacher identification of these traits. Additional demographic characteristics of students and teachers were also examined to determine if they added to the moral judgment prediction equation.

Findings for teacher, disruptive student, and nondisruptive student moral judgment levels were in the predicted direction. Nondisruptive students were found to have a higher level of moral maturity than disruptive students; teachers were found to have a higher moral judgment level that either student group. The differences were highly significant. In addition, teacher mean moral judgment level was found to be closer to that of nondisruptive than to disruptive students.

Predicted directions for the student demographic characteristics were not affirmed for the total student group nor for the disruptive

subgroup. Neither age, academic rating, socioeconomic status, nor school membership added to the prediction of moral judgment level. In the nondisruptive group, school membership related significantly to moral judgment level. Students in Schools B and C showed higher mean moral judgment scores than those in School A.

Predicted directions for teacher demographic characteristics were affirmed (the null hypothesis was not rejected). None of the teacher variables examined added significantly to the prediction of moral judgment level.

The Scoring System

Before interpretation of these findings, a word about scoring is in order. Appendix A shows the latest description of Kohlberg's six moral stages (Kohlberg, 1976a). In numerical terms, a subject whose moral reasoning is totally Stage 1 would receive a score of 100, a total Stage 2 subject would receive a score of 200, and so on up to 600. The 1976 scoring manual (Kohlberg, et al.) reflects criterion concepts only up to Stage 5, so that was the highest possible score in this study. The rationale of this lowering of the highest stage is the total lack of available protocols representing Stage 6 among studies carried out to date (see Kohlberg et al., 1976). Recent scoring procedures (Kohlberg et al., 1976; Kohlberg, 1976a; Kuhmerker, 1976) have tended to lower typical scores received by subjects, and this should be kept in mind by those who have read earlier studies by Kohlberg, his colleagues, and

those using his instrument. Relationships among subjects should remain the same, but overall global maturity scores for moral judgment tend to be lower in the present system.

When a subject is exactly at a particular stage or within one fourth of that stage (scores of 176 - 224 for Stage 2, for example), he is given a global score of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. When one fourth to one half of a subject's reasoning is at the adjacent stage, he receives a score reflecting major and minor stages. A score of 167 would translate to a global score of 2(1); a score of 228 would be a 2(3), and so on. If a subject is exactly halfway between two stages, he receives a score of 1/2(150), 2/3(250), 3/4(350), or 4/5(450). There are, then, three possible kinds of stage scores derived from the continuous numerical scores which were used in the data analysis--"pure" stage scores which are exactly in or within one fourth of a particular stage in either direction, major (minor) stage scores where one fourth or more but less than one half of a subject's score is at a stage adjacent to the major stage score in either direction, and divided scores where exactly half of a subject's reasoning is at each of two adjacent stages. (Occasionally, reasoning at nonadjacent stages occurs--Stage 2 reasoning in a predominantly Stage 4 protocol, for instance--but such a finding is rare and usually represents only a single statement or concept for the subject. In the present study, less than five out of a total of 90 protocols represented such nonadjacent stage reasoning.) Representative teacher and student protocols from this study are shown in Appendix D.

Interpretation of Findings

In his original data, Kohlberg (1958) indicated that students rated low on measures of "reliable conformity" by teachers and delinquent students showed more evidence of preconventional moral reasoning, while students rated higher and nondelinquents showed more evidence of conventional moral reasoning. This direction was evident in the present study. The mean of 194 for disruptive students represents some Stage 1 usage, while the nondisruptive student mean of 224 reflects a significantly higher usage of Stage 3 conventional reasoning. Both the disruptive and the nondisruptive student Stage 2 mean scores indicated a focus on "individualism, instrumental purpose, and exchange" (Kohlberg, 1976a, p. 34). At this stage (see Appendix A), Kohlberg describes "right" as "what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement," and the "reasons for doing right" as "serving one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their interests, too" (1976a, p. 34). Reflected in the 194 score for disruptive students are elements of Stage 1 "heteronomous morality" as well, although there is only a trend in this direction, not a minor stage. "Right" at Stage 1 is "to avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property," and "reasons for doing right" are "avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities" (Kohlberg, 1976a, p. 34). In the disruptive group, 11 out of 30 students showed Stage 1

as a minor or half stage, while only three students in the nondisruptive group showed this. Typical Stage 2 responses taken from the protocols of this study are:

Question: "Why should people do everything they can to save another person's life?"

Answers: "Because you'd like them to do the same thing for you if you were in their place." "Someone might do it for me so I would do it for them."

Question: "Why should people generally do everything they can to keep from breaking the law?"

Answers: "Because if people keep on stealing there's going to be more people mad at you." "Because they don't want records and because they want to get the best job they can." "So taxes and stuff won't be so high. Because taxes go up whenever crime rates go up."

Typical Stage 1 responses taken from the protocols are:

Question: "Why should people generally do everything they can to keep from breaking the law?"

Answers: "So they won't get in trouble." "Because you'd get put in jail."

In order for a response to be coded Stage 1, it must remain unanalyzed in terms of higher stage criterion concepts (see scoring manual, Kohlberg et al., 1976).

The mean of 224 for nondisruptive students, while still within Stage 2, is within one point of a Stage 3 minor stage. Stage 3 represents a conventional morality of "mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and interpersonal conformity"; "right" involves living up to roles and expectations, "having good motives," "showing concern about others," and maintaining "trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude," and "reasons for doing right" involve the "need to be a good person in your eyes and those of others," "caring for others," and "a desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior" (Kohlberg, 1976a, p. 34). Eight nondisruptive students showed Stage 3 as a major or half stage and seven showed it as a major stage with Stage 2 as a minor stage. Only two disruptive students showed Stage 3 as a minor stage, and only one showed it as his major stage. Thus, half of the nondisruptive group showed some conventional Stage 3 reasoning, but only one tenth of the disruptive group did so. Typical Stage 3 responses found in the protocols are:

Question: "Why should people keep promises?"

Answers: "So people will rely on you--in case something happens they will come to you for help." "To keep a better relationship." "Because it would hurt the other person's feelings or mess up all their plans if you didn't keep their promise."

Question: "Why should people generally do everything they can to keep from breaking the law?"

Answer: "Because you are taking away someone else's right when you disobey the law."

Question: "Why should people do everything they can to save another person's life?"

Answers: "Because it will reflect on you--what you do." "I guess if they don't do it, it would be on their conscience for a long time." "A human has a soul and the right to live."

It would appear from the findings for disruptive and nondisruptive students that moral thinking and reasoning processes are related to responsible or irresponsible behavior. Group membership in the student sample accounted for the greatest portion of variance in moral judgment, even though this variance accounted for was relatively small (22 percent). Variances accounted for by school membership (3 percent), academic rating (1 percent), and age and socioeconomic status (less than 1 percent each) were much less than that accounted for by disruptive or nondisruptive group membership. Student age was largely controlled in this study by controlling grade level, however, and thus would not be expected to show a significant influence on moral judgment. Academic rating and socioeconomic status were rather gross measures, as indicated in Chapter III, so, again, the results are not surprising.

Although disruptive and nondisruptive students differed significantly from each other in moral judgment level, these groups were closer to each other than either group was to the teacher group. The teacher mean

moral judgment score of 335 represents Stage 3 reasoning with a Stage 4 minor stage. Stage 4 is the "social system and conscience" stage in which "right" is defined by Kohlberg as fulfilling agreed-upon duties, upholding the laws" except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties," and "contributing to society, the group, or institution." "Reasons for doing right" involve keeping institutions going, avoiding breakdown of the system, meeting the "defined obligations" of one's conscience (1976a, p. 35). In the teacher group, 12 subjects were "pure" Stage 3, two were halfway between Stages 2 and 3, seven were Stage 3 with a minor or half Stage 4, two were Stage 4 with a minor Stage 3, and four were "pure" Stage 4. One subject was a "pure" Stage 5 and one was a Stage 5 with a minor Stage 4. Since Stage 4 postconventional reasoning in this sample accounts for such a low percentage of the total, the typical reasoning of this stage will not be discussed, but a description of this type of reasoning is shown in Appendix A.

Typical statements from Stage 4 protocols are:

Question: "Why should people generally do everything they can to keep from breaking the law?"

Answers: "If you live under a certain system, you should obey the laws of that system. And if you think they are wrong, you should try to work within the system to change them. If you really think that the system is wrong and there are no ways to change the laws within

the system, then you have to go outside the system. You have to look at the circumstances involved."

"There have been laws for governments. If the laws are reasonably just, it is our civic duty to obey them. But I think if they are unjust there would have to be collective action, not just the action of one individual to change it."

Question: "Why should people do everything they can to save another's life?"

Answer: "I think they have a moral obligation to save a life with dignity."

Question: "Why should people keep promises?"

Answer: "A man's word is his bond."

The mean moral judgment score for nondisruptive students was closer to that of teachers than the disruptive student mean score, thus there was some indication that nondisruptive students were more like their teachers in moral reasoning and thinking processes than were disruptive students. In order to explore this trend more carefully, the researcher tallied moral concerns for each group. In the criterion concepts which are used to score moral stage, moral concerns reflect the actual basis for moral reasoning (see Chapter III). Table 15 shows the distribution of expressed moral concerns in the three groups by number of subjects expressing the concern within each group, teacher, disruptive and non-disruptive students. Although the same moral concern may have

been expressed a number of times by any given subject, each concern was tallied only once per subject.

Table 15.--Frequency of moral concerns expressed by disruptive and nondisruptive students and teachers

	Disruptive students N = 30	Nondisruptive students N = 30	Teachers N = 30
	Frequency	Frequency	Frequency
Individual welfare	27	29	14
Group welfare	5	14	23
Character and motives	20	23	27
Sanctions	27	25	21
Rulefulness	27	24	22
Role norms and obligations	3	5	18
Reciprocity	21	22	10
Contracts, agreements, trusts	4	7	20
Liberty and autonomy	15	11	5
Fairness and equity	1	4	8

Again, student groups resemble each other more than either group resembles teachers. The five concerns reflected most in the student protocols are individual welfare, sanctions, rulefulness, reciprocity, and character and motives. The largest difference in concern focus between

disruptive and nondisruptive students is reflected in the concern for group welfare. Nondisruptive students reflected this concern more frequently (47 percent) than disruptive students (17 percent). This would seem to follow from the findings that nondisruptive students more often show Stage 3 conventional reasoning which reflects a concern for harmony and maintenance of mutual relationships among people.

Teachers showed the most concern for character and motives in their moral judgment. The second highest concern was for group welfare (not among the highest in either student group), followed by concerns for rulefulness and sanctions (also high in the student groups) and a concern for contracts, agreements, and trusts (quite low in both student groups). The teacher concerns which differ from student concerns reflect their higher stage reasoning. Concerns for group welfare and contracts, trusts, and agreements among people are more characteristic of Stages 3, 4, and 5 than of the lower stages of reasoning, since they focus on the group and the rights of all rather than merely on the individual and his needs. Though the differences are very slight in most cases, frequencies and percentages of concerns expressed by nondisruptive students are closer to teachers in eight cases, while disruptive students are closer to teachers in only two cases. Moral concerns have only recently been defined in the scoring system (Kohlberg & Colleagues, 1976; Kohlberg et al., 1976), so the literature does not yet reflect findings from this dimension of moral judgment. The study of moral concerns might be a possible research direction for a more descriptive investigation of moral judgment stages and processes.

The findings for the relationship of student demographic characteristics to moral judgment level in this study are important for what they do not show. Neither age, academic rating, nor socioeconomic status of students related significantly to their moral judgment levels. These findings should be interpreted with extreme caution, however, since age was largely controlled in this study by controlling grade level (ages ranged from only 13.0 to 15.2, therefore differences in moral judgment level would not be expected to be significant), and since academic and socioeconomic measures were gross (see Chapter III). There were more "basic" than "average" students in the disruptive group (17:13), and more "average" than "basic" students in the nondisruptive group (20:10), but the differences did not approach statistical significance.

Mean property value in area of residence (neighborhood block) from the 1970 census was almost identical for the disruptive and nondisruptive groups ($18,240 and $18,303, respectively). Again, the slightly higher mean for nondisruptive students did not approach significance of difference from the disruptive group.

Future researchers attempting to measure these student demographic characteristics should seek access to student records in order to obtain more descriptive ratings for these variables--achievement or I. Q. test scores as an academic or intelligence measure and family income or parents' occupation as a measure of socioeconomic status, for instance. In the present study, the academic rating partially represented placement in academic tracks by test scores, but also reflected past performance, which is a measure of motivation rather than ability in many cases.

Likewise, the socioeconomic rating by property values of residential neighborhood reported in the 1970 census report contains the possibility of error in the amount of time elapsed since the report and in the fact that some students lived in rented rather than owned housing. The time gap allowed for the possibility of new housing (including whole subdivisions) to have been developed which were not reflected in 1970 estimated property values, and it also allows for considerable appreciation or depreciation of property value based on area of residence.

The fourth demographic characteristic of students--the school they attended--related to moral judgment level only in the nondisruptive student group. This finding might indicate that disruptive students randomly selected are somewhat alike regardless of where they attend school, but that nondisruptive students randomly selected represent whatever general characteristics are representative of the total school population. As indicated in Chapter III, there were some differences in the types of school included in the study. Although no correlation of socioeconomic status and school was shown in any of the correlation matrices, it would appear that differences exist somewhere that affect nondisruptive student moral judgment levels. Perhaps these differences are the result of family influences not measured in this study.

The simple correlation of some of the interactions in demographic characteristics of students might bear investigation in a future study. In the total student group there was a very slight correlation of

academic rating and socioeconomic status (r = .28), and this correlation was moderate in the disruptive group (r = .48), but insignificant in the nondisruptive group (r = .13). Possibly the combined effect of academic and socioeconomic ratings in the disruptive group would influence moral judgment level, but this is only a speculation.

The negative correlation of age and academic rating in the total group (r = -.32, see Table 5) and in the nondisruptive student group (r = -.36, see Table 14) was predictable, older students having more likely been retained at a grade level during their school career than younger ones. This correlation was very low in the disruptive group (r = -.18 , see Table 9), but still in the predictable direction. Other interaction correlations in the total student group and in the student subgroups were not relevant to the present study.

Moral judgment levels of teachers had not been investigated in previous studies,nor had moral judgment levels been measured as a function of teacher demographic characteristics. The findings indicate that none of the demographic variables measured in this study contributed significantly to moral judgment level. Subject area taught, school membership, race, and educational level accounted for the highest percentages of variances accounted for in moral judgment level, but these variances were all below 10 percent of the the total variance accounted for, and none of the variances was significant at the .05 level. Other demographic factors than those evaluated in this study evidently account for most of the variance in teacher moral judgment level, measures perhaps of social class, intelligence, or abstract thinking levels. These latter characteristics are probably represented in very weak form in the teacher educational

level and subject area taught variables, but these variables did not significantly affect moral judgment level when considered separately.

Limitations and Considerations

The following limitations should be considered when evaluating the results of this study:

1.) Controls for age, sex, race, and grade level in the student sample used to focus on developmental differences and differences based on group membership limit the generalizability of this study. Only eighth grade Caucasian males within a two-year age range were included.

2.) Participation in this study by both students and teachers was voluntary, and randomness of the sample might have been affected by those in the original sample who chose not to participate or whose parents did not consent to participation.

3.) The sample in this study was limited to students at three junior high schools and an alternative public school of one school district in a specific urban area of a southeastern state. Findings may not be generalizable to students and teachers of differing regions and backgrounds.

4.) Subjects were interviewed at different times and places throughout the school day, and this may have allowed for inconsistencies in the data collected. The activities of the day, time of day,

and student feelings about the subject area class from which they were being taken for the interview all could have affected attitudes, relative willingness to participate, and seriousness of attention to the interview. Teachers could also have been affected by these factors.

5.) Demographic data were furnished by the subjects themselves, and no attempts were made to further validate these data.

6.) No attempt was made to control for the effect of the taping procedure other than to explain to the subjects the necessity for later transcription of the interview for coding.

7.) The researcher had prior knowledge of group membership of disruptive and nondisruptive students, even though at the exact time of interview, she made a deliberate attempt to remain "blind" to this identification (i.e., interviewing was done as permission was obtained, and group identification was never made after the random sampling process until after interviewing and coding had been completed). Occasionally, however, office personnel, teachers, or other students would make comments like, "Oh, no, not Johnny!", or in other ways would suggest that the student being taken from the class was somewhat of a troublemaker. Teachers, too, were readily identified in the interview process. Since the same questions were presented to each subject, however, each subject had an equal opportunity to respond; therefore, teachers and both student groups should have had an equal chance to demonstrate mature moral judgment.

8.) The researcher was a stranger to most of the subjects or had only met with each subject (in the case of teachers) briefly before the interviewing. This may have inhibited responses, especially on the part of students. Both teacher and student subjects might have said what they thought the researcher "wanted to hear," as indicated in the comment of one teacher who quoted a colleague as saying that he had not said what he really thought in response to the questions.

9.) Varying verbal abilities of students and teachers may have affected outcomes. Although every attempt was made to explain unfamiliar terms such as "moral" to students, and to reinterpret questions not understood, some still may have been confused. Even teachers interpreted terms differently, some distinguishing the terms "moral" and "legal," for instance, and others indicating that those terms were synonymous.

Because critics have commented on the high verbal requirements necessary to respond at high stages on Kohlberg's interview, this factor was explored further by this researcher. A random sample of five protocols were drawn from those representing three ranges of scores--low (100-199), middle (200-299), and high (300 and above). A word count was then done on a question that was easily understood and answered by all subjects, "Why should people keep promises?" For the samples drawn, average word count for the low group was eight, for the middle group, 20, and for the high group, 56. Even with the removal of an exceptionally long response (167 words) in the high group, average word count was 28.

Simpson (1974) leveled a particularly harsh criticism at Kohlberg's interview and scale relative to the high verbal requirement, and what she called high levels of cultural and social class bias. She stated in reference to Stage 5 and 6 answers outlined by Rest et al. (1969) that:

> The language used in the protocols of stage-5 and stage-6 subjects raises other questions about the structural aspects of the moral development interviews. The ability to make a principled "hit," as Rest calls a clear score, seems to depend upon the capacity to refer to hierarchies and principles, to universal ideas, and especially to concepts such as justice, equality, and reciprocity at a high level of abstraction. (p. 94)

Referencing a particularly lofty Stage 6 response cited in the Rest et al. article, she continued:

> Is this a measure of success at Philosophy 800 . . . or is it a measure of the development of moral reasoning? Oh pity the poor savages in our state colleges, our ghettos, in villages and tribes abroad who cannot express themselves so neatly, so profoundly, and so elegantly! By Kohlberg's definition, they may never know principled reasoning. (p. 95)

Simpson concluded that such lofty statements need to be tested in action rather than just words, for "perhaps, too, the extent to which principled reasoning has been truly learned, rather than merely articulated, cannot be known without behavior indices" (p. 95).

Several researchers have experimented with nonverbal response techniques in Piaget stories which usually require high verbal ability. Buchanan and Thompson (1973) presented children with a "devil scale"

and a "spank scale" in which they chose on a size continuum the amount of deviance they attributed to characters in the stories and the amount of punishment they thought they should have. After hearing stories, children pushed a button to light up the appropriate spot on the devil and spank scales. An experimenter in another room recorded results. Two of the advantages the researchers cite for this quantitative scale bear directly on the ability to verbalize: 1) the scale is not dependent on the child's verbalizing, and 2) amount of material a child must remember before making a decision is reduced. They found higher understanding of intention in young subjects using this technique.

Chandler, Greenspan, and Barenboim (1974) found that children as young as 7 years old could understand intention in stories measuring moral judgment if situations were presented in other than a verbal format. They used video-taped stories along with verbal ones and found a significantly earlier recognition of intentionality when children saw the stories acted out. According to the researchers, the medium is the message, and their results "suggest that previously published findings indicating that young children are unresponsive to issues of intentionality are methodological artifacts of the verbal assessment procedures employed" (p. 315).

Such variations of format might be used in future studies of moral judgment done with Kohlberg's dilemmas in order to facilitate student responding, although the more complex nature of Kohlberg's dilemmas and questions would make this difficult. Objective measures

of moral judgment might also be considered, but a limitation of an objective test of moral judgment is that choice or content becomes the focus rather that process and structure. Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, and Anderson (1974) have developed an objective measure of Kohlberg's basic stage theory (the Defining Issues Test), the results of which correlate .68 with Kohlberg's scale, and Maitland and Goldman (1974) have also experimented with such a measure, but these do not overcome the problem of verbal ability, since a high reading level is required to take these tests. With younger subjects (even the eighth graders in this study) this would create a problem.

Evaluation of the validity of Kohlberg's stage model and instrument is beyond the scope of this study and yet ultimately such evaluation is important in interpreting results of this and similar studies. Since invariant sequence and cross-cultural universality are the validating criteria that Kohlberg states are necessary for his model and instrument (1976a), the results reported here must be accepted with the assumption that past validating studies reported by Kohlberg from 1958 to the present (1976a) are reliable. Criticisms by Kurtines and Greif (1974), Simpson (1974), Peters (1975) and Rest et al. (1974) suggest that much is yet to be learned about Kohlberg's measure and model. This researcher has accepted Kohlberg's methodology on the basis of the type of reasoning stated by Porter and Taylor (1976):

> We should emphasize that the Kohlberg "test" is not a highly standardized and precise measurement, and a person's "score" is not an absolute mark that explains

> everything. We prefer to think of the dilemmas outlined as useful tools in getting to know how a person views questions that most of us would call moral questions. And they are even more useful in that we can relate one person's answers to those of others by seeing all the diverse answers in terms of moral development. (p. 6)

In light of this acceptance of the method, differential kinds of thinking and different concerns found in this study do suggest that there are elements of moral thinking and reasoning processes that can distinguish different groups classified by behavior. That is, students identified as behavior problems in the school setting exhibit significantly lower stages of moral reasoning than those not so identified.

Implications

The implication for school practice suggested by these findings seems to be that training of students in moral thinking and reasoning processes would be a productive direction for both regular classrooms and special behavior adjustment programs. If the differential moral judgment levels of the two student groups in this study are an indication, it would appear that higher stages of moral reasoning do relate to more mature or acceptable behavior in the school setting. If we assume that such moral thinking and reasoning processes can be trained, then programs designed to do this might be assumed to raise the level of "reliable conformity" among school students. Several programs and resources have been developed to help teachers initiate moral discussions in classrooms and to guide schools in setting up "just communities"

as described by Kohlberg (1976b). These programs have a cognitive basis rather than a reward and punishment (token economy or behavior modification) focus. The Lifeline program of McPhail, Ungoed-Thomas, and Chapman (1975) and the moral dilemma units of Selman and Kohlberg (1976) are two such cognitive programs which are available. The filmstrips for elementary students called First Things: Values (Guidance Associates, 1972) and First Things: Social Reasoning (Guidance Associates, 1975) have been designed for use in a Kohlberg type moral education curriculum.

Porter and Taylor (1976) have created a simplified guide for assessing moral reasoning of students, and guidebooks such as those of Mattox (1975), Galbraith and Jones (1976), and Hall and Davis (1975) give general overviews of content and technique for classroom moral discussions. Preliminary findings (Wasserman, 1976; Kohlberg & Turiel, in preparation) are just coming in from early research on the "just community concept" in schools, so it is impossible to report on research trends for these programs as yet. Rest (1974) has provided the only comprehensive review of "Kohlbergian" programs to date, but he includes only programs in process, not research findings. Kuhmerker (1973b) has also given a general review of Kohlberg's programs.

Maturity of moral thought does relate to maturity of moral action in this study, as predicted by Kohlberg (1971c, 1975a). Although no guarantee of mature moral behavior growing out of more mature reasoning patterns can be suggested by this study, conventional morality does

seem to characterize more mature behavior overall, at least in the school settings sampled in this research.

Summary

The problems and purposes of this research have been addressed in the following ways:

1.) A relationship of moral judgment and moral behavior has been shown in the differential scores of eighth grade male Caucasian identified problem students and control students with the same demographic characteristics. The predicted direction of lower levels of moral reasoning for disruptive youngsters and more conventional reasoning of nondisruptive students on Kohlberg's measure was found. Earlier findings for more severe types of deviancy and delinquency seemed to be predictive for the moral reasoning of these less severely disruptive students who have distressed teachers with their behavior while remaining within the school setting.

2.) Teacher moral judgment has been investigated and compared to that of both disruptive and nondisruptive students. As predicted, the mean moral judgment level for nondisruptive students was closer to the teacher mean than the mean for disruptive students. Further, an informal analysis of moral concerns underlying stages of moral judgment showed teacher and nondisruptive student concerns to be more alike than teacher and disruptive student concerns. However, differences between the total

student groups and teachers were greater than those between the two student subgroups on both measures. Teacher moral judgment was not found to be a function of any of the demographic characteristics assessed for them in this study--sex, race, educational level, subject taught, school taught in, or years of teaching experience.

3.) Student demographic characteristics not controlled in the study were not found to relate significantly to moral judgment level in the total student group nor in the disruptive subgroup. In the nondisruptive subgroup, only school attended was a significant predictor of moral judgment. This finding seemed to indicate that for this sample population, disruptive students were somewhat alike regardless of school membership, whereas nondisruptive students perhaps reflected characteristics of their school of membership. The factors of academic rating, socioeconomic status, and age (which was largely controlled in this study by the grade level control) did not relate significantly to moral judgment levels of students, however, suggesting that other and more sensitive demographic measures be investigated in future research. Specifically, test measures for academic performance, measures of parent education, income or occupation for socioeconomic levels, and measures of family background and interaction processes need to be investigated.

4.) These findings combined describe one aspect of the "hidden curriculum" of schools--that of teacher and pupil moral thinking and reasoning processes which inevitably interact in the classroom setting. Although the closer relationship of teacher reasoning processes to

nondisruptive students may indicate that teachers understand these students more readily and thus identify them as problems less often, there seem to be differences which exist outside of this identification process. The implication of this seems to be that if moral maturity of students was enhanced through developmental programs, those causing problems of disruption might learn to act more maturely on the basis of these more mature moral judgments. School programs which are implementing moral discussions and "just community" concepts to raise moral maturity levels would seem to be on the right track, but findings are needed from research on such programs to verify such an assumption. A limitation of the suggestion for school program implementation is that such programs cannot reach into the home and family environment which no doubt explains a great deal about the variations in student moral reasoning processes.

In conclusion, a dialogue attributed to Socrates and Meno seems appropriate to describe the purposes and results of this study. Meno is quoted as saying to Socrates:

> "Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?" (Quoted in Sizer & Sizer, 1970, p. 11)

This is the question that respondents to educational polls seem to be raising over disruptive behavior in schools, moral development and education, and what should be done to combat the problem while promoting the development.

The response attributed to Socrates, however, is problematic:

> "You must think I am very fortunate to know how virtue is acquired. The fact is that far from knowing whether it can be taught, I have no idea what virtue really is." (Quoted in Sizer & Sizer, 1970, p. 57)

This study has suggested one possible piece--albeit a very small piece--of the puzzle of what "virtue" or moral behavior might be. Moral judgment processes seem to be a variable contributing to student mature moral behavior. The contributing factors of this moral judgment process itself remain an enigma for future investigators, however, as do the exact methods by which "virtue" or mature moral behavior might be taught.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A
KOHLBERG'S SIX MORAL STAGES

	Content of Stage		
Level and Stage	What is Right	Reasons for Doing Right	*Social Perspective of Stage*
LEVEL I--PRE-CONVENTIONAL Stage 1--Heteronomous Morality	To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake and avoiding physical damage to persons and property.	Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.	*Egocentric point of view.* Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.
Stage 2--Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange	Following the rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interest and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.	To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their interests, too.	*Concrete individualistic perspective.* Aware that everybody has his own interest to pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).

	Content of Stage		
Level and Stage	What is Right	Reasons for Doing Right	*Social Perspective of Stage*
LEVEL II-- CONVENTIONAL Stage 3-- Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity.	Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude.	The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior.	*Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals.* Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself in the other guy's shoes. Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.
Stage 4-- Social System and Conscience	Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.	To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everyone did it," or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations (Easily confused with Stage 3 belief in rules and authority; see text.)	*Differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives.* Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.

	Content of Stage		
Level and Stage	What is Right	Reasons for Doing Right	*Social Perspective of Stage*
LEVEL III--POST-CONVENTIONAL, or PRINCIPLED Stage 5--Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights	Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights like *life* and *liberty*, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.	A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, "the greatest good for the greatest number."	*Prior-to-society perspective.* Perspective of the rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective, impartiality, and due process. Considers moral and legal points of view; recognizes that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them.

	Content of Stage		
Level and Stage	What is Right	Reasons for Doing Right	*Social Perspective of Stage*
Stage 6--Universal Ethical Principles	Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.	The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.	*Perspective of a moral point of view* from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

NOTE: From "Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach" by L. Kohlberg. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976, pp. 34-35. Copyright 1976 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Used by permission.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B
MORAL JUDGMENT INTERVIEW

Form A

Dilemma III: In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000, which was half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

1. Should Heinz steal the drug? Why or why not?

2. If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the drug for her? Why or why not?

3. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug for the stranger? Why or why not?

4. (If you favor stealing the drug for a friend): Suppose it's a pet animal he loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet animal? Why or why not?

5. Why should people do everything they can to save another's life, anyhow?

6. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that make it morally wrong? Why or why not?

7. Why should people generally do everything they can to avoid breaking the law, anyhow?

7a. How does this relate to Heinz's case?

Dilemma III': Heinz did break into the store. He stole the drug and gave it to his wife. In the newspapers the next day, there was an account of the robbery. Mr. Brown, a police officer who knew Heinz, read the account. He remembered seeing Heinz running away from the store and realized that it was Heinz who stole the drug. Mr. Brown wonders whether he should report that Heinz was the robber.

1. Should Officer Brown report Heinz for stealing? Why or why not?

2. Officer Brown finds and arrests Heinz. Heinz is brought to court, and a jury is selected. The jury's job is to find whether a person is innocent or guilty of committing a crime. The jury finds Heinz guilty. It is up to the judge to determine the sentence. Should the judge give Heinz some sentence, or should he suspend the sentence and let Heinz go free? Why?

3. Thinking in terms of society, why should people who break the law be punished?

3a. How does this relate to Heinz's case?

4. Heinz was acting out of conscience when he stole the drug. What reasons are there for not punishing a lawbreaker if he is acting out of conscience?

5. What does the word conscience mean to you anyhow? If you were Heinz, how would your conscience enter into the decision?

6. Heinz has to make a moral decision. Should a moral decision be based on one's feelings or on one's thinking and reasoning about right and wrong?

7. Is Heinz's problem a moral problem? Why or why not? In general, what makes something a moral problem or what does the word morality mean to you?

8. If Heinz is going to decide what to do thinking about what's really right, there must be some answer, some right solution. Is there really some correct solution to moral problems like Heinz's or when people disagree is everybody's opinion equally right? Why?

9. How do you know when you've come up with a good moral decision? Is there a way of thinking or method by which one can reach a good or adequate decision?

10. Most people believe that thinking and reasoning in science can lead to a correct answer. Is the same thing true in moral decisions or are they different?

Dilemma I: Joe is a fourteen-year-boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the $40 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thinks of refusing to give his father the money.

1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? Why or why not?

2. In what way is the fact that Joe earned the money himself something very important for the father to consider?

3. The father promised Joe he could go to camp if he earned the money. Is that promise something very important for the father or Joe to consider. Why or why not?

4. Why in general should a promise be kept?

5. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well and probably won't see again? Why or why not?

6. What do you think is the most important thing for a good son to be concerned about in his relationship to his father in this or other situations?

6a. Why is that important?

7. What do you think is the most important thing for a good father to be concerned about in his relationship with his son in this or other situations?

8. Why is that important?

NOTE: From Assessing Moral Stages: A Manual (Pt. IV) by L. Kohlberg et al. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, August 1976, unnumbered pages. Used by permission of the Moral Education Center, Harvard University.

APPENDIX C
LETTER AND CONSENT FORMS

APPENDIX C
LETTER TO PARENTS

_____,1976

Dear _____,

From time to time, educational research is carried out in public schools. I am an instructor in the College of Education at Florida Technological University, and I am currently conducting an interview project in your son's school, _____. The principal, a member of the guidance staff, and the county research department have approved this project.

I asked that a list of 20 eighth grade boys be drawn from schedule cards at your son's school and that a list of 10 teachers be provided also. The name of your child, _____, was on the list I received from his school. A total of 60 boys and 30 teachers from three schools in _____ are being asked to participate.

For my research, I am studying the ways young adolescents think and reason when asked to make a decision in an interview situation, and I am comparing their response with those of teachers. To do this, I need to interview typical students and teachers for about 20 minutes each. The interview consists of "made-up" stories for the subjects to respond to; each story presents a moral situation where a decision needs to be made. The questions are not personal in nature; only your child's reactions and reasons are asked. Many students and teachers have participated in this type of interview, and some school programs have used such stories in teaching about moral responsibility and decision-making. Ten teachers from your son's school have already been interviewed.

If you do not object to having your child participate, I would like to interview him sometime during the school day within the next few weeks, at a time to be arranged with the school. There will be no conflict with any class tests or special activities. I will tape the interview so that all of the answers from students and teachers can be compared. All interviews will be confidential, and no participant will be identified personally in any report of this study.

I think your son will enjoy the interview and find it interesting, and, in addition, his answers will help me to understand the thinking of boys in his age group. If you give permission for the interview, please sign the attached form and return it to me at your child's school. I will not proceed with any interviewing until parent permission is obtained.

If, for any reason, you do not want your son to participate in this research, or if he does not wish to participate, please indicate in the space provided at the bottom of the consent form and return it to me.

If you have any questions, I hope you will contact me at FTU (275-2401) where I work or at my home (894-4376). I will be most grateful for your consent and the help of your son in my study.

Sincerely,

Mrs. Sharon Lee Hiett

Copy to: (Principal's name)

Enclosures: Consent form and stamped envelope for return to me at your son's school.

APPENDIX C
STUDENT INFORMED CONSENT

Please sign and return this to me in the enclosed envelope as soon as possible.

Child's Name:

Address:

Project: Teacher and Pupil Reasoning and Decision-Making Processes on Moral Dilemmas in an Interview Situation

Researcher: Mrs. Sharon Lee Hiett

I, the undersigned, certify that I have read the attached description of the nature and purpose of the above project, and I agree to have my minor child, whose name is _____, participate in this study. I understand that the project involves an interview with my child which will last about 20 minutes, and that this interview will be tape-recorded. No child will be identified personally in any report of this research; the results will be confidential and will not be placed in the child's school file. I understand that participation in this project is voluntary and that I may withdraw this consent at any time.

_____ _____
Signature of Parent or Guardian Date

I, the undersigned, have provided a written description of the nature and purpose of this study to the volunteer and his parents, indicating that his participation is voluntary and that he (or his parents) may withdraw consent at any time.

_____ _____
Researcher's Signature Date

Please sign here only if you do NOT want your child to participate.

I do not wish for my son to participate in this study.

_____ _____
Signature of Parent or Guardian Date

APPENDIX C
TEACHER INFORMED CONSENT

Participant's Name:

Address:

Project: Teacher and Pupil Reasoning and Decision-Making Processes on Moral Dilemmas in an Interview Situation

Researcher's Name: Mrs. Sharon Lee Hiett

I, the undersigned, certify that the researcher whose name is signed below has explained the nature and purpose of this study to me. I agree to participate in the study with the understanding that no participant will be identified individually in any report of the research. My participation is voluntary, and I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time.

_____ _____

Participant's Signature Date

I, the undersigned, have defined and explained this study to the participant, indicating that his/her participation is voluntary and that he/she may withdraw consent at any time.

_____ _____

Researcher's Signature Date

APPENDICES D
SAMPLE MORAL JUDGMENT INTERVIEWS

APPENDIX D-1
SAMPLE TEACHER INTERVIEW

Dilemma III:

SHOULD HEINZ STEAL THE DRUG? WHY OR WHY NOT?

No he shouldn't steal the drug. Because it would be breaking whatever laws may exist I would imagine.

IF HEINZ DOESN'T LOVE HIS WIFE, SHOULD HE STEAL THE DRUG FOR HER? WHY OR WHY NOT?

He might whether he should or not - probably not. I imagine if saving a life is your main concern - although your feelings concern with the depth of your emotion - it really shouldn't make any difference.

WHAT IF THE PERSON IS NOT HIS WIFE BUT A STRANGER. SHOULD HEINZ STEAL THE DRUG FOR THE STRANGER? WHY OR WHY NOT?

I would think so, yes. An emotional attachment makes no difference - if something is wrong it is wrong.

WHAT IF IT WAS A PET ANIMAL THAT HE LOVED. SHOULD HE CONSIDER STEALING TO SAVE THE PET ANIMAL? WHY OR WHY NOT?

No because you've got the human element and there is a distinction. Although you may consider it, there is a difference.

WHY SHOULD PEOPLE DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO SAVE ANOTHER'S LIFE, ANY-HOW?

Well, because we respect life and life is the ultimate gift. And we should have enough respect for our own life and those of other people to do everything we can to keep life.

IT IS AGAINST THE LAW FOR HEINZ TO STEAL. DOES THAT MAKE IT MORALLY WRONG? WHY OR WHY NOT?

No, because sometimes laws are wrong themselves. So Heinz may think it is not wrong for him to think of stealing - getting the drug for the reason that he wants to get it may be right but he should go within the law.

WHY SHOULD PEOPLE GENERALLY DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO AVOID BREAKING THE LAW, ANYHOW?

Well, if you live under a certain system, then you should obey the laws of that system. And if you think they are wrong, you should try to work within the system to change them. If you really think that the system is really wrong and there is no ways to change the laws within the system, then you may have to go outside of the system. You have to look at the circumstances involved.

Dilemma III':

SHOULD OFFICER BROWN REPORT HEINZ FOR STEALING? WHY OR WHY NOT?

I imagine he should - it is his job. Whether I would if I were him is another complication.

WHY SHOULD HE REPORT HIM?

Because that is the responsibility he has taken on as a police officer.

SHOULD THE JUDGE GIVE HEINZ SOME SENTENCE, OR SHOULD HE SUSPEND THE SENTENCE AND LET HEINZ GO FREE? WHY?

Probably he should suspend the sentence. Because he was acting under duress and strain and it was a special set of circumstances. It wasn't just pure theft - he did it for someone he loved.

THINKING IN TERMS OF SOCIETY, WHY SHOULD PEOPLE WHO BREAK THE LAW BE PUNISHED?

Because society sets up rules and they are the rules that are to be obeyed. Someone who transgresses the law should be punished in some way - it may be just token punishment. But if society does not take a positive action, the law should not be made in the first place.

HOW DOES THIS RELATE TO HEINZ"S CASE?

There was a law against theft and he did steal the drug. So he should receive some sort of punishment. But it could be token.

HEINZ WAS ACTING OUT OF CONSCIENCE WHEN HE STOLE THE DRUG. WHAT REASONS ARE THERE FOR NOT PUNISHING A LAWBREAKER IF HE IS ACTING OUT OF CONSCIENCE?

Well, you have to look at the circumstances surrounding the crime and the reasons would be more on a personal basis. You would have to make a personal judgment whether that strain the person was acting under was worth having a law broken.

WHAT DOES THE WORD CONSCIENCE MEAN TO YOU, ANYHOW? IF YOU WERE HEINZ, HOW WOULD YOUR CONSCIENCE ENTER INTO THE DECISION?

Well, conscience in that respect would be your emotional feelings toward the law compared to your emotional feelings toward the personal situation. And I am sure there would be some sort of conflict. Whichever was strong would make the decision.

HEINZ HAS TO MAKE A MORAL DECISION? SHOULD A MORAL DECISION BE BASED ON ONE'S FEELINGS OR ON ONE'S THINKING AND REASONING ABOUT RIGHT OR WRONG?

Well, it should be based on one's thinking about right or wrong. However, as in this particular situation, one cannot keep one's feelings out of the picture so it should be based on thinking.

IS HEINZ'S PROBLEM A MORAL PROBLEM? WHY OR WHY NOT? IN GENERAL, WHAT MAKES SOMETHING A MORAL PROBLEM OR WHAT DOES THE WORD MORALITY MEAN TO YOU?

I think his problem is more of a legal problem than a moral problem. The morality of it is whether the law is right or wrong given different sets of circumstances. Morality concerns to me things being right in terms of life and in terms of how things should be. The law does not always reflect morality as one person may construe it.

IF HEINZ IS GOING TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO BY THINKING ABOUT WHAT'S REALLY RIGHT, THERE MUST BE SOME ANSWER, SOME RIGHT SOLUTION. IS THERE REALLY SOME CORRECT SOLUTION TO MORAL PROBLEMS LIKE HEINZ'S, OR WHEN PEOPLE DISAGREE IS EVERYBODY'S OPINION EQUALLY RIGHT? WHY?

I don't think - morality depends on society at the time. The majority or the strongest faction will generally rule. I suppose everyone believes that they are equally right, but what they think will not be in the governing force in our society. Morality changes with society.

HOW DO YOU KNOW WHEN YOU'VE COME UP WITH A GOOD MORAL DECISION? IS THERE A WAY OF THINKING OR METHOD BY WHICH ONE CAN REACH A GOOD OR ADEQUATE DECISION?

Well, I don't know - I'm sure there is but I haven't, in a while, stopped to think about the thinking process that I was going through

to reach a decision like that. Yet you have to judge what is morally correct for you given the situation and circumstances that you are in and in relation to all these things is where you would make your decision.

MOST PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT THINKING AND REASONING IN SCIENCE CAN LEAD TO A CORRECT ANSWER. IS THE SAME THING TRUE IN MORAL DECISIONS OR ARE THEY DIFFERENT?

Oh, I'm sure it's true but we don't normally reach decisions--moral decisions--scientifically. I'm sure you can set certain rules that govern decision-making process and that way you can reach some sort of answer for yourself. However, I don't think that's the way it's done normally.

Dilemma I:

SHOULD JOE REFUSE TO GIVE HIS FATHER THE MONEY? WHY OR WHY NOT?

I don't know whether he can refuse in his situation but he should have that right. After all, it's his money and his father did tell him that he could use the money to go to camp. The reason for his father wanting to take the money is not, in my judgment, strong enough for him to give him the money. If it were sickness or something like that it would be different.

IN WHAT WAY IS THE FACT THAT JOE EARNED THE MONEY HIMSELF SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FATHER TO CONSIDER?

Well, it's not his money. It's the son's money. There are some situations where when a child earns money it goes into the family money. But in this case that was not the situation. Unless what the child was planning to use the money for was against some code or rule set down by the family unit or was illegal--then the child should be allowed to use the money for whatever was discussed he should use it for.

THE FATHER PROMISED JOE HE COULD GO TO CAMP IF HE EARNED THE MONEY. IS THAT PROMISE SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FATHER OR JOE TO CONSIDER? WHY OR WHY NOT?

Oh, yes.

WHY?

When you make some sort of agreement with a child you should keep your agreement. How can the father expect Joe to be someone who is going to stand by his word if he doesn't set the right example? Joe is going to learn by example.

WHY IN GENERAL SHOULD A PROMISE BE KEPT?

For that same reason. When you give your word morally that is the right thing to do.

IS IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP A PROMISE TO SOMEONE YOU DON'T KNOW WELL AND PROBABLY WON'T SEE AGAIN? WHY OR WHY NOT?

Yes, sometimes we keep promises more with people like that when I really think that wouldn't be as important as keeping a promise to someone we are close to. If you give your word, unless you have extenuating circumstances, you should follow that word.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FOR A GOOD SON TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT IN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS FATHER IN THIS OR OTHER SITUATIONS?

Well, there are a lot of important things. Respect, which you might lose in a situation like this. Happiness in the sense that you are compatible and that you enjoy each other's company. I think, respect, in my mind, and mutual understanding.

WHY WOULD THAT BE IMPORTANT?

When you can look up to a person and respect each other, you can enjoy your relationship together.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FOR A GOOD FATHER TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT IN HIS RELATIONSHIP TO HIS SON IN THIS OR OTHER SITUATIONS?

The same thing--that he have his son's respect and that he earned it and that he loved him and not put material things before emotional bonds. Teach the son the correct values in life--however he may term them.

REASON THE SAME?

Generally yes.

APPENDIX D-2
SAMPLE STUDENT INTERVIEW

Dilemma III:

SHOULD HEINZ STEAL THE DRUG?

No.

WHY NOT?

Well, like if they catch him, they'll send him to prison or something and then to court and his wife will die anyways.

IF HEINZ DIDN'T LOVE HIS WIFE, SHOULD HE CONSIDER STEALING THE DRUG FOR HER AT ALL?

No.

YOU SAY HE STILL SHOULDN'T?

No.

WHAT IF THE PERSON DYING IS NOT HIS WIFE BUT A STRANGER? SHOULD HE STEAL THE DRUG FOR A STRANGER?

No.

WHAT IF IT'S A PET ANIMAL HE LOVES? SHOULD HEINZ STEAL THE DRUG TO SAVE THE PET ANIMAL?

No.

ARE YOU GIVING THE SAME REASON?

Yes.

WHY SHOULD PEOPLE DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO SAVE ANOTHER PERSON'S LIFE?

Sometimes they want to be a hero or something.

IT IS AGAINST THE LAW FOR HEINZ TO STEAL. DOES THAT MAKE IT MORALLY WRONG?

Yes.

WHY?

You're not supposed; you're not supposed to.

WHY SHOULD PEOPLE GENERALLY DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO KEEP FROM BREAKING THE LAW?

Because if they don't everybody will start breaking it and there won't be any law to break.

HOW DOES THIS RELATE TO THIS SITUATION OF HEINZ AND HIS WIFE?

I guess he'll just have to get a loan or something.

Dilemma III':

SHOULD OFFICER BROWN REPORT HEINZ FOR STEALING?

Yes.

WHY SHOULD HE?

Because if he didn't respect it somebody might find out about it and might blackmail him or something.

DOES IT MATTER THAT HE'S A POLICE OFFICER?

Yes--no, not really.

ANYBODY SHOULD REPORT IT?

Yeah.

SHOULD THE JUDGE GIVE HEINZ SOME SENTENCE OR SHOULD HE SUSPEND THE SENTENCE AND LET HEINZ GO FREE?

He should sentence him.

WHY?

Because if you don't sentence him other people will think they can break the law and not get a sentence.

HEINZ SAYS HE WAS ACTING OUT OF CONSCIENCE WHEN HE STOLE THE DRUG. IS THERE ANY REASON FOR NOT PUNISHING A LAW BREAKER WHEN HE SAYS HE IS ACTING OUT OF HIS CONSCIENCE?

You mean like if he's crazy or something?

NO - CONSCIENCE LIKE IF HE FELT WHAT HE WAS DOING WAS RIGHT.

No.

WHY NOT?

I don't know.

SO EVEN IF A PERSON SAYS HE KNOWS HE'S RIGHT, HE STILL SHOULD BE PUNISHED IF HE BROKE THE LAW?

Yeah.

WHAT DOES THE WORD CONSCIENCE MEAN TO YOU?

Your mind or something.

IF I WERE TO SAY I HAVE A GUILTY CONSCIENCE, WHAT WOULD I MEAN?

You have something on your mind that's not right.

IF YOU WERE HEINZ HOW WOULD YOUR CONSCIENCE ENTER INTO THIS SITUATION?

About stealing the drug?

YES.

I'd steal it.

WHY DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD?

If you love your wife, you probably would do anything for her.

HEINZ HAS TO MAKE A MORAL DECISION. SHOULD A MORAL DECISION BE BASED ON ONE'S FEELINGS OR ON ONE'S THINKING AND REASONING ABOUT RIGHT AND WRONG?

His thinking.

WHY WOULD YOU SAY THAT?

He should know right from wrong.

CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT THE WORD MORALITY MEANS TO YOU OR WHAT MAKES SOMETHING A MORAL PROBLEM?

What the problem is or something?

IF I SAID, "HE IS A VERY MORAL MAN," WHAT WOULD I MEAN?

I don't know what moral means.

IF HEINZ IS GOING TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO BY THINKING ABOUT WHAT'S REALLY RIGHT, THERE MUST BE SOME ANSWER OR SOME RIGHT SOLUTION. IS THERE SOME CORRECT SOLUTION TO MORAL PROBLEMS LIKE HEINZ'S, OR WHEN PEOPLE DISAGREE IS EVERYBODY'S OPINION EQUALLY RIGHT?

There ain't no right answer to it.

IF ONE PERSON SAYS, "I THINK HE WAS RIGHT TO STEAL THE DRUG," AND I SAY I THINK HE WAS WRONG, DO YOU THINK EITHER OPINION WOULD BE RIGHT OR ONLY ONE?

One.

WHICH ONE WOULD BE RIGHT?

The one -- like he's not supposed to steal.

HOW DO YOU KNOW WHEN YOU'VE COME UP WITH A GOOD DECISION ABOUT RIGHT OR WRONG?

Get the facts of what he did or something.

WHAT IF YOU HAD TO MAKE A DECISION YOURSELF? HOW DO YOU KNOW WHETHER YOU'VE MADE THE RIGHT ONE OR NOT?

I don't know.

MOST PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT THINKING AND REASONING IN SCIENCE CAN LEAD TO A CORRECT ANSWER. IS THE SAME THING TRUE IN MORAL DECISIONS LIKE HEINZ'S OR ARE THEY DIFFERENT?

The same, I guess.

SO IF YOU THINK LONG ENOUGH YOU CAN COME UP WITH THE RIGHT ANSWER?

Yes.

Dilemma I:

SHOULD JOE REFUSE TO GIVE HIS FATHER THE MONEY?

Yes, in a way--like he did his own thing and made his own money--it should be his.

IN WHAT WAY IS THE FACT THAT JOE EARNED THE MONEY HIMSELF SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FATHER TO CONSIDER?

If it's more important for his father to go somewhere I guess he should.

THE FATHER PROMISED JOE HE COULD GO TO CAMP IF HE EARNED THE MONEY. IS THAT PROMISE SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FATHER OR JOE TO CONSIDER?

For the father to consider.

HOW IS THAT IMPORTANT?

Because he told Joe he could go to camp if he saved up his own money.

WHY DO YOU THINK PROMISES SHOULD BE KEPT?

Then the person won't believe the promiser anymore.

IS IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP A PROMISE TO SOMEONE YOU DON'T KNOW WELL AND PROBABLY WON'T SEE AGAIN?

Yes.

WHY WOULD YOU SAY IT'S STILL IMPORTANT?

You might meet them someday--you never know.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SON TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT IN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS FATHER?

Doing things together.

WHY WOULD THAT BE IMPORTANT?

To get to know your Dad.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FOR A GOOD FATHER TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT IN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS SON?

To take him places and do things with him.

WHY IS THAT IMPORTANT?

So the father can get to know his son.

APPENDIX D-3
SAMPLE STUDENT INTERVIEW

SHOULD HEINZ STEAL THE DRUG?

No.

WHY NOT?

It's against the law. He should maybe compromise with the man who made the drug and maybe he could pay back a certain part of it every month. He could give him something of his to hold until he paid it back like his t.v. set. Maybe he could give him a certain part of his paycheck every month.

SUPPOSE THE MAN WOULDN'T AGREE TO THAT. SUPPOSE HE STILL SAID THE SAME THING?

Well, I don't know. Maybe he could keep trying to borrow money.

WHAT WOULD BE YOUR REASON THEN FOR TELLING HIM NOT TO STEAL IT?

Because if he made up the drug he wouldn't want anybody else to steal it.

IF HEINZ DIDN'T LOVE HIS WIFE WOULD THAT MAKE IT ANY DIFFERENT? WOULD THAT BE A PART OF THE ISSUE?

If he loves her he'd do it but if he didn't I don't think he would.

SUPPOSE THE PERSON DYING IS NOT HIS WIFE BUT A STRANGER. SHOULD HE CONSIDER STEALING IT FOR A STRANGER?

He should do everything he would do if it was his wife.

SUPPOSE IT'S A PET ANIMAL HE LOVES. SHOULD HE STEAL IT TO SAVE THE PET ANIMAL?

No.

WOULD YOU CONSIDER THAT DIFFERENT?

Yes.

HOW WOULD THAT BE DIFFERENT?

It's not a human life.

WHY SHOULD PEOPLE DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO SAVE ANOTHER PERSON'S LIFE?

Because it's a human life and if they were dying they would want someone to do everything they could to save them.

IT IS AGAINST THE LAW FOR HEINZ TO STEAL. DOES THAT MAKE IT MORALLY WRONG?

Partly--because he's trying to save a human life.

HOW DOES THAT FIGURE IN?

He'd be stealing to save a life rather than just stealing it to make money off of it.

SO THAT WOULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

Yeah.

WHY SHOULD PEOPLE DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO KEEP FROM BREAKING THE LAW?

If he did it to save his wife and then the same thing happened to someone else whose wife was dying then pretty soon everybody would be doing it, then everybody would just start stealing.

Dilemma III':

SHOULD OFFICER BROWN REPORT HEINZ FOR STEALING?

Yes, because he broke into the store and that's against the law.

SHOULD THE JUDGE GIVE HEINZ SOME SENTENCE, OR SHOULD HE SUSPEND THE SENTENCE AND LET HEINZ GO FREE?

He should make him pay the price of the drug--at least what he says and then just pay him when he gets his paycheck. He was trying to save a life and he saved her.

THINKING IN TERMS OF SOCIETY, WHY SHOULD PEOPLE WHO BREAK THE LAW BE PUNISHED?

Because he did wrong.

HOW DOES THIS RELATE TO HEINZ'S CASE?

He broke the law but he was trying to save a life.

HEINZ SAYS HE WAS FOLLOWING HIS CONSCIENCE WHEN HE STOLE THE DRUG. ARE THERE ANY REASONS FOR NOT PUNISHING A LAWBREAKER WHEN HE IS ACTING OUT OF HIS CONSCIENCE?

He should still be punished because if he is following his conscience--that means he has a pretty bad conscience and he will just continue to steal.

WHAT DOES THE WORD CONSCIENCE MEAN TO YOU?

Your mind--the way it acts.

IF YOU WERE HEINZ, HOW WOULD YOUR CONSCIENCE ENTER INTO THE DECISION?

I probably would have done the same thing.

WHY WOULD YOU HAVE?

To save my wife.

HEINZ HAS TO MAKE A MORAL DECISION. SHOULD A MORAL DECISION BE BASED ON A PERSON'S THINKING AND REASONING OR ON HIS FEELINGS ABOUT RIGHT AND WRONG?

I would have thought about it for awhile.

SO TO YOU THINKING IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN FEELING?

Yes. But in this one it would be mostly feelings.

DO YOU THINK HEINZ'S PROBLEM IS A MORAL PROBLEM? WHAT DOES THE WORD MORALITY MEAN TO YOU?

I'm not sure.

IS IT A PROBLEM HAVING TO DO WITH RIGHT AND WRONG?

Yes.

IF HEINZ IS GOING TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO BY THINKING ABOUT WHAT'S REALLY RIGHT THERE MUST BE SOME ANSWER OR SOME RIGHT SOLUTION. IS THERE REALLY SOME CORRECT SOLUTION TO A MORAL PROBLEM LIKE HEINZ'S OR WHEN PEOPLE DISAGREE IS EVERYBODY'S OPINION EQUALLY RIGHT?

Well everybody is going to say something different.

DO YOU THINK THEY WOULD ALL BE EQUALLY RIGHT?

No.

WHY NOT?

Some might say he should and some might say he shouldn't have. And the only one that would really be right would be the one who is human in what he should do.

HOW DO YOU KNOW WHEN YOU'VE COME UP WITH A GOOD DECISION ABOUT RIGHT AND WRONG?

If it's right you just know it.

HOW DO YOU KNOW IT?

It turns out right.

MOST PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT THINKING AND REASONING IN SCIENCE CAN LEAD TO A CORRECT ANSWER. IS THE SAME THING TRUE IN DECISIONS ABOUT RIGHT AND WRONG OR ARE THEY DIFFERENT?

The same thing.

Dilemma I:

SHOULD JOE REFUSE TO GIVE HIS FATHER THE MONEY?

No, because his Dad gives him lunch money and gives him his house and love and care so Joe could do that to repay his Dad.

IN WHAT WAY IS THE FACT THAT JOE EARNED THE MONEY HIMSELF SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FATHER TO CONSIDER?

Really, the father could get the money in one week of work. And, Joe, he worked really hard for the money.

THE FATHER PROMISED JOE HE COULD GO TO CAMP IF HE EARNED THE MONEY. IS THAT PROMISE SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FATHER OR JOE TO CONSIDER?

Yes.

WHY IS THAT?

Because he's probably been looking forward to it and saving the money and the father promised him. And then when the fishing trip came up he just broke his promise.

WHY SHOULD PEOPLE KEEP PROMISES, IN GENERAL?

If you promise somebody something and you break it, then they'll never ask you a favor or anything.

IS IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP A PROMISE TO SOMEONE YOU DON'T KNOW WELL AND PROBABLY WON'T SEE AGAIN?

If you weren't going to see them again you really wouldn't want to make a good promise. But if it were someone you knew well you would probably want to keep it.

WHY WOULD IT BE DIFFERENT IF YOU WEREN'T GOING TO SEE THEM AGAIN?

Because you wouldn't be able to keep the promise if you didn't ever see them again.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FOR A GOOD SON TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT IN HIS RELATIONSHIP TO HIS FATHER?

That he could do that one thing for his father because his father always does a lot of stuff for him.

WHAT, IN GENERAL, SHOULD GOOD SONS BE CONCERNED ABOUT WITH THEIR FATHERS?

That the boy should think he has a long way to go and the father is gonna die pretty soon and the boy has a long time to live.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FOR A GOOD FATHER TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT IN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS SON?

He should want to bring him up right. He should keep promises like this so that when his son grows up and has kids, he'll do the same thing.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Sharon (Brown) Hiett was born November 24, 1943, in West Palm Beach, Florida, only child of Jimmy and Leola Brown. She attended public schools in West Palm Beach, graduating from Palm Beach High School in 1961. That same year, she entered the University of Florida, where she majored in English and secondary education, graduating with honors in 1965. She continued in graduate school at the University, obtaining her Master of Education degree in 1966 with a major in English education.

Her first teaching position was in Jacksonville at Paxon Junior High School where she taught seventh grade English during the 1965-66 school year. She then returned to Gainesville to join the middle school faculty of the P. K. Yonge Laboratory School where she taught until 1971. Between 1966 and 1971, Mrs. Hiett spent two summers in Europe, one as a tour leader for a junior high summer travel program with the American Institute for Foreign Study, one summer at the University of Hawaii, and one summer as a consultant to the middle school of the American School of Asuncion, Paraguay.

In 1971 she accepted a position as instructor in the College of Education at Florida Technological University in Orlando, Florida, where she is currently employed as an Assistant Professor in the Teaching Analysis Department. She is a member of Phi Delta Kappa.

Sharon and Russel Hiett were married April 20, 1974, and both entered doctoral programs at the University of Florida in 1975. They currently live in Orlando with their cat Mimi.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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

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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the College of Education and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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